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Chinese Patents as Copyrights 
BENJAMIN PIWEI LIU* 
INTRODUCTION 
Although harmonization efforts such as the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Patent 
Corporation Treaty regime have brought national patent systems closer, 
differences among them remain a continuing challenge to innovators in an 
interconnected global marketplace.  The recent development of the Chinese 
patent system is of particular interest because China is the factory of the 
world, the most populous market, the home of the patent office that handles 
the most patent application filings, and the number one source of imports 
that violate intellectual property rights (IPR).  Its patent system affects eve-
ry company whose supply chain, competitor or market footprint touches 
China.  Moreover, developing countries are increasingly looking to China 
for an alternative IPR model.  China’s patent system may well be the basis 
of new norms for other emerging economies.
1
 
Unfortunately, the Chinese patent system tends to be compared to 
United States’ patent doctrines and practices with the subtext of character-
izing it negatively in a seemingly haphazard array of excesses or inadequa-
cies: the quantities of its utility model and design patents are growing too 
fast;
2
 the scope of its invention patents is too narrow;
3
 there are too many 
 
* Assistant Professor and Director of the Chinese Intellectual Property Resource Center, 
The John Marshall Law School.  This Article is based on a presentation given during a sym-
posium at Campbell Law School, hosted by the Campbell Law Review.  It was also present-
ed at Tokyo University organized by Toshiya Watanabe.  The author thanks participants of 
these events for their helpful comments as well as Llewellyn Gibbons for his thoughtful 
feedback.  He would also like to thank the staff of the Campbell Law Review for their excel-
lent editorial assistance. 
 1. Peter Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, in HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Christoph Antons ed., forthcoming 2012) (“China’s 
innovation models may attract the attention of other countries that are working hard to catch 
up with developed countries.”). 
 2. Eve Y. Zhou & Bob Stembridge, Patented in China, The Present and Future State 
of Innovation in China, THE LEDA GROUP 21–23, http://ledagroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/China_Report_0810.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2012); Jody Lu, Who 
is Making Junk Patents?, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (May 4, 2011), 
http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=690; Patents, Yes; Ideas Maybe, 
THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17257940?story_id=17 
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defenses available to an infringer;
4
 the patent enforcement administration is 
not specialized enough;
5
 and so forth.  Each of these relativistic differences 
marks an individual tree, but there is still a lack of vision of the forest.  
Moreover, perceiving the Chinese patent system as a parade of individual 
IPR horrors creates a self-fulfilling tragedy.  As John Orcutt and Hong 
Shen warned in a study on Chinese innovation strategy, “Starting from 
such a negative position encourages foreign businesspersons to underesti-
mate the importance of law in China, and thereby fail to properly protect 
their legal interests when operating in China.”6 
Beyond these practical concerns, the choice of descriptive modes pre-
supposes a questionable normative stance.  The relativistic mode—one that 
essentializes the Chinese patent system as a lesser doppelgänger of the 
United States patent system—implicitly condones a neo-colonial vantage 
that presumes the primacy of the United States patent law and the com-
plaints of non-Chinese companies.
7
  A holistic model, by contrast, would 
describe the Chinese patent system by what it is, not by what it is not.  The 
central question is whether we can capture the Chinese patent system on its 
own terms. 
This Article explores a possible organizing logic that unifies the Chi-
nese patent system’s seemingly unrelated deviations from United States’ 
expectations into a coherent architecture—that of copyright.  Specifically, 
 
257940 (questioning the quality of the rapidly growing utility model patents). 
 3. SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE 25 (2006) (“While China’s patent laws are largely compliant with the 
TRIPS Agreement, right holders have noted that the narrow scope of patentable subject mat-
ter under Chinese law makes patents for transgenic plants and animals virtually unobtaina-
ble.”). 
 4. EU-CHINA PROJECT ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, THIRD 
REVISION OF CHINA’S PATENT LAW: LEGAL TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS ON THE DRAFTING 
PROCESS 2006–2008, 112 (2009), (criticizing the prior art defense). 
 5. Id. at 1.  The project explains: 
We are also concerned by what seems to be an extension of the number of Courts 
having jurisdiction over patent matters.  Experience, in Europe, leads to limit as 
much as possible the number of such “patent courts”, so as to facilitate the re-
cruitment of technically competent judges and ensure consistency in their deci-
sions.  It seems that China is moving in the opposite direction, and we are afraid 
that, regardless of the efforts that SIPO will make to provide training, local Courts 
will find it difficult to maintain quality and consistency. 
Id. 
 6. JOHN L. ORCUTT & HONG SHEN, SHAPING CHINA’S INNOVATION FUTURE: 
UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION 111 (2011). 
 7. Peter Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual Prop-
erty Disputes: What We Can Learn From Mediators, Business Strategists, and International 
Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 650 (2002); see also id. at 580 n.70 (listing 
scholarship discussing the imperialistic aspect of global intellectual property regime). 
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this study compares the Chinese patent system to common abstractions that 
have come to distinguish patents from copyrights, the two pillars of crea-
tive Intellectual Property (IP), and argues that Chinese patent law’s move-
ment towards a copyright paradigm is illustrated by idiosyncrasies such as: 
its preference for protecting particularized, physically fixed embodiments, 
substantial similarity-based infringement tests, the prevalence of use- and 
source-based defenses, and the absence of patent specific enforcement ad-
ministration. 
Although the primary goal of this article is to provide a descriptive ac-
count of the Chinese patent system, the actual existence of a copyright-like 
patent system contributes to ongoing theoretical debate over the appropriate 
design of innovation law.  Scholars regularly question the doctrinal separa-
tion between patent and copyright and advance proposals to borrow fea-
tures from one to give to the other.  Some of the examples include Mark 
Lemley and Christopher Cotropia’s examination of copying in patent law,8 
Jeanne Fromer’s study comparing claim scope between copyrights and pa-
tents,
9
 Lorelei Ritchie de Larena’s10 and Maureen A. O’Rourke’s sugges-
tions importing the fair use defense into patent law,
11
 Samson Vermont ex-
ploring the possibility of importing the independent creation doctrine into 
patent law,
12
 James Bessen and Michael Meurer’s criticism of the indefi-
niteness in current patent rights and recommended cures that step in the di-
rection of the copyright paradigm, just to a name a few.
13
  That the Chinese 
patent system actually embodies these suggestions, intentionally or not, 
provides an ongoing experiment to test the operation of these principles 
that even their proponents have considered mere theoretical possibilities. 
Section I examines four broad aspects of the Chinese patent system for 
copyright-like features.  Many so-called patents in China are narrowly 
drawn industrial protections against a copyist.  Patent defenses resemble 
that of classic copyright defenses, and Chinese patent administrators and 
judges occasionally slip into the mode of copyright enforcement.  Section 
 
 8. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Frontiers in Empirical Patent Law 
Scholarship: Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421 (2009). 
 9. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009). 
 10. Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, What Copyright Teaches Patent Law About “Fair Use” 
and Why Universities Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR. L. REV. 779, 780 (2005) (discussing a 
possible fair use doctrine in patent law). 
 11. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1177, 1188 (2000) (discussing a possible fair use doctrine in patent law). 
 12. Samson Vermont, Independent Invention As a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 475, 480–81 (2007) (discussing the possibility of importing the independent 
creation doctrine into patent law). 
 13. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 29–45, 235–53 (2008). 
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II advances several causes to explain the tendency of the Chinese patent 
system to exhibit copyright-like features.  The tendency to focus on copy-
ing is a natural response to foreign pressure seeking redress for IPR theft, 
even though historically these calls arose in the context of copyright piracy 
and trademark counterfeiting.  It also coincides with China’s own aspira-
tion for technological development where concrete rights protect improved 
embodiments while giving wide berth to subsequent improvers.  IPR en-
forcement under the copyrights paradigm is simpler and easier to imple-
ment when the state lacks sufficient capacity to address complex infringe-
ment issues.  Apart from these pragmatic reasons, a copyright paradigm 
offers a coherent morality of IPR that is probably more palatable than the 
winner-take-all regime that the traditional patent paradigm presupposes.  
Section III draws out the implications of a copyrights-tinted patent system. 
For China, we can anticipate its industrial asset protection to place greater 
emphasis on the curtailing of unauthorized copying but less concerned with 
setting out a zone of technological exclusivity.  For developing countries, 
the Chinese approach provides an alternative patent model designed to re-
balance innovation and development.  Developed countries may also look 
to China’s experiment with copyright-like features for improvements to its 
own patent system. 
I.  COPYRIGHT-LIKE FEATURES OF THE CHINESE PATENT SYSTEM 
The United States Trade Representative (USTR), in its latest report to 
Congress on China’s Compliance with its World Trade Organization 
(WTO) commitments, acknowledged that “China has put in place a frame-
work of laws and regulations aimed at protecting the intellectual property 
rights of domestic and foreign right holders, as required by [the TRIPS 
Agreement].”14  Its consistency with TRIPS notwithstanding, several fea-
tures of the Chinese patent system appears to depart from conventional no-
tions of the patent system viewed from the vantage of the United States pa-
tent practice.  Curiously, these differences appear to eschew notions of a 
strong patent system in a direction that is curiously reminiscent of copy-
rights.  First, the Chinese patent office now receives approximately one 
million utility model and design patents a year, both of which are essential-
ly copyrights for industrial products.  Second, even apart from these lesser 
patents, the Chinese invention patents tend to have a penchant for greater 
physical concreteness and closer concordance to real exemplars.  Third, 
several defenses under Chinese patent law map well onto familiar copy-
right defenses such as fair use.  Fourth, Chinese Courts and agencies en-
 
 14. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 4 (2011). 
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trusted with patent enforcements are also in charge of copyrights and occa-
sionally slip into a copyright mode of infringement analysis. 
A. Designs and Utility Model Patents 
Much of the explosive growth of Chinese patents is attributable to the 
protection of design and utility models.  It has become fashionable for crit-
ics of the Chinese patent system to question the usefulness, or even the 
danger, of granting so many patents to what appears to be trivial or low 
quality improvements.
15
  And yet it is the ubiquity of utility model and de-
sign patents that provide the first clue of analogizing the Chinese patent 
system to a system of copyrights. 
Jerome Reichman noted nearly two decades ago that these industrial 
protections are “legal hybrids” between the copyright and patent paradigms 
based on his study of the German patent system.
16
  This systemwas repli-
cated in Japan.
17
  Later China studied both countries closely when drafting 
its own modern patent law.
18
 
A Chinese utility model patent offers ten years of protection for new 
technical solutions relating to a product’s shape, structure, or a combination 
thereof, which is fit for practical use.
19
  A utility model patent is registered 
at the State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China 
 
 15. Eve Y. Zhou & Bob Stembridge, Patented in China, The Present and Future State 
of Innovation in China, THE LEDA GROUP 21–23, http://ledagroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/China_Report_0810.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2012); Jody Lu, Who 
is Making Junk Patents?, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (May 4, 2011), 
http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=690; Patents, Yes; Ideas Maybe, 
THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17257940?story_id=17 
257940 (questioning the quality of utility model patents); China to Curb “Junk Patents”, 
CHINA.ORG (Dec. 29, 2005), http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/153629.htm (reporting 
the view of Tian Lipu, the Chinese patent office commissioner, that “most junk patents are 
within the category of utility model and design”). 
 16. J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2453–64 (1994). 
 17. Toshiko Takenaka, Harmonizing the Japanese Patent System With Its U.S. Coun-
terpart Through Judge-Made Law: Interaction Between Japanese and U.S. Case Law De-
velopments, 7 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 249, 250 (1998) (“Most of the Japanese judicial sys-
tem is based on the German system, particularly the German court system and the 
procedural aspects of German Law.  This is particularly true with respect to the Japanese 
patent system, because many current patent statutes are translations of their German coun-
terparts.”). 
 18. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 69 (1995). 
 19. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Mar. 12, 1984), ch. 1 CHINA PAT. art. 2, 42 
(1984). 
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(SIPO) without substantive examination, although its validity depends on 
novelty, inventiveness, and utility similar to that of an invention patent, but 
the level of inventiveness need not be as high as an invention patent.
20
 It is 
subjected to examination and invalidity challenge at the time of enforce-
ment.
21
  An industrial design patent covers any new design of a product’s 
shape, pattern or a combination thereof, as well as the combination of the 
color and the shape or pattern of a product, which creates an aesthetic feel-
ing and is fit for industrial application.
22
  Design patents also require novel-
ty and inventiveness.  But as in the case of utility models, the level of in-
ventiveness also need not be as high as that of an invention patent and in 
any event SIPO does not examine these applications on these substantive 
issues.  Instead, they are examined for compliance with formal require-
ments.  To restate this in copyright terms, both utility model patents and 
design patents are directed to specific, physically fixed embodiments that 
require originality and a modicum of inventiveness, with registration being 
the only formality required—the same list of criteria associated with the 
perfection of copyright.
23
 
To be certain, these lesser patents are available in a number of coun-
tries including Japan, Korea, and Germany.
24
  The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office acknowledges an overlap between design patents and 
copyright where the same subject (such as an ornamental design) may ob-
tain both forms of protection.
25
  And even though U.S. patent law does not 
provide utility model protection, United States judges noted the similarity 
between the German utility model and copyright.
26
  However, it would be a 
stretch to call the patent system of these countries a copyright system simp-
ly because utility model patents and design patents exist. 
What sets China apart is the sheer number of utility and design pa-
tents.  In 2010, SIPO accepted 1.22 million patent applications.  Of these, 
 
 20. Raymond M. Gabriel, The Patent Revolution: Proposed Reforms in Chinese Intel-
lectual Property Law, Policy, and Practice Are the Latest Step to Bolster Patent Protection 
in China, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 323, 334 (2008). 
 21. Id. at ch. 2 CHINA PAT. art. 22. 
 22. Id. at ch. 1 CHINA PAT. art. 2. 
 23. Preston M. Torbert & Zhao Jia, People’s Republic of China, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA 233, 238 (Alan S. Gutterman & Robert Brown eds., 1997) 
(discussing utility models and designs in China). 
 24. WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS—2011 EDITION, 206–07 
(2011) [hereinafter WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. INDICATORS 2011] (listing Japanese, Kore-
an and German industrial design applications in 2011). 
 25. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1512 (8th ed., 8th rev. ed. 2010). 
 26. Timothy R. Holbrook, Should Foreign Patent Law Matter?, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
581, 584 (2012) (citing In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1036–38 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
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390,000 were invention patents, 410,000 were utility model patents and 
420,000 were industrial design patents.
27
  In contrast, the total number of 
patents filed in the United States was only about half a million in 2010.
28
  
In 2011, 1.63 million patents were filed in China, representing a growth of 
33 percent.
29
  About a third of these patents are design patents (522,000), 
and another third of these patents are utility model patents (585,000).
30
  The 
amount and distribution of these patent types are visualized in the chart be-
low. 
Figure 1  
 
Figure 1 represents these numbers in a pie chart to show the over-
whelming presence of utility model patents and design patents in China in 
units of 1000 applications.  The inner and outer circles represent the 
amount of filings in 2010 and 2011, respectively.  About two-thirds of all 
patent applications filed during these two years fall under these lesser pa-
tents.  In comparison, the Japanese and German patent offices only re-
ceived 31,756 and 6,285 design patent applications in 2010, respectively.
31
 
 
 27. China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
OFFICE OF CHINA (April 29, 2011), 
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/whitepapers/201104/t201104 
29_602312.html. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 1.633 Million Patent Applications Received in 2011, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
OFFICE OF CHINA (Jan. 17, 2012), http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/whitepapers/201104/ 
t20110429_602312.html. 
 30. Id. 
 31. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 2011, supra note 24, at 206–07. 
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The data on granted patents show an even more explicit proclivity to-
wards registered physical embodiments.  In 2010, SIPO issued 814,825 pa-
tents; 135,110 invention patents were granted (16.6%); 344,472 utility 
model patents were granted (42.3% of total); and 335,243 industrial design 
patents were granted (41.1% of total).
32
  Over 80% of all recent grants are 
utility model and design patents. 
Many criticize some of these patents as low quality patents or “junk 
patents” because they are not examined and provide a very narrow scope of 
protection.
33
  This view ignores the fact that owners of these IP assets have 
been very successful at protecting against the copying of specific embodi-
ments just as copyright protects against the slavish copying of specific ex-
pressions.  Some of the most pro-plaintiff patent cases in China involve de-
sign and utility model patents.
34
  Even in countries like Germany where the 
level of innovation and economic development are closer to the United 
States than China, utility model and design patents have allowed innovative 
companies like Apple to block smartphone competitors to great strategic 
effect.
35
  That these protections operate like copyrights also explains their 
numerosity: protection is based on the pinpointed protection of a specific 
product in the marketplace, and not based on staking out a broad claim 
scope.  Therefore separate applications are necessary to protect different 
product lines as opposed to a broad patent.  In the final analysis, about 
780,000 patents, or 80% of the patents issued in China in 2010, were essen-
tially copyrights of industrial assets. 
 
 32. China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2010, supra note 27. 
 33. See, e.g., Lu, supra note 15; Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, supra note 15 (questioning 
the quality of utility model patents); Xinhua News Agency, China to Curb “Junk Patents”, 
supra note 15 (reporting the view of Tian Lipu, commissioner of the State Intellectual Prop-
erty Office, that “most junk patents are within the category of utility model and design”); 
Meng Fanxin, Application of Equivalent Doctrine in Utility Model Patent Infringement 
Lawsuit, CHINA PATENTS & TRADEMARKS (2006) (noting that a large number of utility mod-
el patents are not inventive enough). 
 34. See German Company Wins Key Design Patent Case in China, STATE 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE OF CHINA (Feb. 2, 2009), 
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/news/internationalip/ 
200904/t20090417_454486.html (discussing successful design patent litigations and the im-
portance of design patent in protection automobile parts); Legal News Alert, The Chint v. 
Schneider Settlement: 157 Million Reasons to Believe Chinese Patent Holder’s Rights Have 
Muscle (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.foley.com/intelligence/detail.aspx?int=9074 (summa-
rizing the largest IP damage award in China, which involved a utility model patent). 
 35. UPDATE 1-German Court Upholds Ban of Samsung’s Older Tablet, REUTERS, Jan. 
31, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/samsung-apple-
idUSL5E8CV1I620120131. 
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B. Invention Patents 
Working in the U.S. context, Jeanne Fromer plots the different IP 
claiming styles in two dimensions: the patent paradigm employs peripheral 
claiming by characteristics to protect a broad text-delineated scope, while 
the copyright paradigm employs central claiming by exemplar to protect 
pinpointed embodiments.
36
  In theory, the invention patents that take up the 
remaining 20% of granted Chinese patents should conform to the character-
istics of utility patents in the United States.  In practice, even invention pa-
tents subtly lean towards the copyrights paradigm, with its emphasis on the 
concrete and the specific.  For example, patent eligibility rules disfavor 
claim types that are prone to be broad and ambiguous.  Thus, certain pro-
cess inventions are not patent eligible in China.  Written description rules 
tends to tether the scope of allowed claims closer to the exemplars actually 
disclosed in the patent specification than their United States counterpart.  
As a result of the stricter patent eligibility and written description rules, the 
scope of Chinese patents claims appear to hew close to the disclosed exem-
plars in a way that is reminiscent of copyrights, not unlike the design and 
utility model patents already discussed in the previous section. 
1. Patent Eligibility Rules Disfavor Claim Types Prone to be Broad 
and Ambiguous 
Article 2 of the Chinese patent law defines invention as “any new 
technical solution relating to a product, a process or improvement there-
of.”37  Under this technical solution requirement, an invention must “em-
ploy technical means to solve a technical problem to obtain a technical ef-
fect.”38  In addition, Article 25 enumerates specific exclusions from patent 
eligibility including scientific discoveries, rules and methods for mental ac-
tivities, and methods for the diagnosis or for the treatment of diseases.
39
 
When evaluating the patent application, examiners will first look to 
whether the claimed invention solves a technical problem and avoid the in-
eligible categories based on the description of the technology before 
searching for prior art.  Pure business method patents not tied to any com-
puter software or machine will probably fall under the category of un-
 
 36. Fromer, supra note 9. 
 37. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 1 CHINA PAT. 
art. 2. 
 38. See Meng Xianghai, A Study on Article 2.2 of the PRC Patent Law, KING & WOOD 
(June 2010), http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=A-Study-on-Article-22-of-the-
PRC-Patent-Law&language=en (citing Guidelines for Patent Examination pt. 2, ch. 1, 
STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE OF CHINA (2010)). 
 39. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 2 CHINA PAT. 
art. 25 (1)–(3). 
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patentable pure mental activities.
40
  For example, a computer-implemented 
method for organizing tourist waiting times at busy sightseeing locations 
will be rejected at this stage notwithstanding the use of a computer system 
to implement this process.  The problem presented here—one directed to 
the efficient organization of tourists and avoiding congestion—is not a 
technical problem within the meaning of Article 2(1) and is possibly ex-
cluded as rules and methods for mental activities under Article 25(2).
41
  
Next, if it appears that there is a technical problem and solution in the de-
scription, the examiner will proceed to search for prior art.  If it appears 
that the technical problem had been solved in the prior art, the examiner 
will re-determine the actual problem and solution and re-evaluate whether 
it is a technical problem and solution under Article 2. 
The stricter utility requirement and enumerated exceptions disfavor 
several claim types such as business method claims or inference-based 
medical diagnostic claims that are particularly notoriously problematic in 
the United States.
42
 
Many of these inventions may be rewritten into product patents to 
avoid a patent eligibility challenge.
43
  Novel software methods often in-
volve the use of new devices or the novel combination of existing products 
that are themselves patentable.
44
  Pharmaceutical use claims may be rewrit-
ten as Swiss-type product claims.
45
  Because both claim styles describe the 
same invention, one might criticize the Chinese rule as elevating claim 
form over claim substance.  However, claim form matters in the market-
place: a businessman can point to a physically embodied electronic device 
or diagnostic kit and ask if it is an infringement to copy the product.  It is 
 
 40. Jasper Kwoh, Patentability of Business Method Claims in China and Taiwan, 85 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 434, 438 (2003) (discussing the criteria for patenting busi-
ness method in China); SIPO, Patent Protection of New Technologies (2009) (requiring the 
business method claims to include hardware and satisfy technical character). 
 41. Li Deshan, The Patentability of Business Methods, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
MAGAZINE (Dec. 2008), http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=456; 
Steve Song & Guowei Liu, Patent Eligibility of Business Method in China from US Per-
spective, 1 CHINA PATS. & TRADEMARKS 54, 56 (2011). 
 42. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 131–32, 244–46 (discussing the legal cost of 
patent litigation and the boundary problem in biotech and software area). 
 43. See ROBERT MERGES & JOHN DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 154 (5th ed.) (“However, process claims can usually be redrafted into machine 
claims that provide equivalent protection of the intellectual property.”). 
 44. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (permitting the 
patentability of electric circuitry elements that embody mathematical operations). 
 45. Liantao Li & Tina Tai, Features of Swiss-type Claims, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, Apr. 1, 2009 (discussing the use of Swiss-type claim for pharmaceuticals in Chi-
na that claims a product containing chemicals used to treat a condition instead of the treat-
ment method itself). 
10
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more challenging to make that determination if the product is protected 
through a patented manufacturing process and drives up the information 
cost of determining permissible and impermissible copying. 
The net result is that Chinese patent law enhances its notice function 
by forcing innovators to describe their contribution as a physical embodi-
ment for many valuable innovations that are litigated today. 
2. Written Description Rule Tethers Claim Scope to Exemplars 
If subject matter eligibility predominantly impacts business method 
patents, the strict written description rule reins in patent scope in the unpre-
dictable arts.  SIPO examiners construe the disclosure narrowly, with the 
result that the scope of patent claims hews much closer to the literal text of 
the disclosure than their U.S. counterparts.
46
 
In China, a subject matter is considered disclosed only if it is literally 
recited in the original specification or if it can be directly determined from 
the original specification and drawings.
47
  In practice, not much can be di-
rectly determined from the original specification beyond what was literally 
recited in the unpredictable arts, and experimental data obtained from one 
embodiment can only support a claim directed to that embodiment plus a 
band of equivalents surrounding it.
48
 
A comparison of United States and Chinese pharmaceutical patent 
claims illustrates the tendency of Chinese claim scope to trace actual em-
bodiments and United States patent claims to cut a larger swath of products 
or processes.  A comparison of the Chinese Viagra patent with its United 
States counterpart illustrates the possible claim scope difference.
49
  The 
Chinese patent for Viagra® contained a single claim: 
 
 46. See Masakazu Ichikawa, et al., Comparative Studies on Patent Examination Prac-
tice Among China, United States and Japan, FIRST JIPA-IPO ASIAN PACIFIC INT’L 
CONGRESS (Sept. 14–15, 2005), 
www.ipo.org/AM/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm?ContentFileID=6481 (detailing the difference in 
claim scope due to different written description and support requirements). 
 47. Peng Li, Kenneth X. Xie & David T. Yang, Patent Procurement and Enforcement 
in China: A Field Guide, MORRISON & FOERSTER QUARTERLY NEWS 7 (2011); Guidelines 
for Patent Examination, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE OF CHINA (2010), 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zlsqzn/sczn2010eng.pdf. 
 48. Li, Xie, & Yang, supra note 47, at 7. 
 49. J. Benjamin Bai, Peter J. Wang & Helen Cheng, What Multinational Companies 
Need to Know About Patent Invalidation and Patent Litigation in China, 5 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 449, 451 (2007); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protect-
ing Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 985 (2006); Jeffrey A. 
Andrews, Pfizer’s Viagra Patent and the Promise of Patent Protection in China, 28 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2006) (detailing the Viagra dispute); ORCUTT & SHEN, supra 
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Use of -[2-ethoxy-5-(4-methyl-1-piperazinosulfonyl)phenyl]-1-methyl- 3-
n-propyl-1,6- dihydro-7H-pyrazolo[4,3-d]pyrimidin-7-one or a pharmaceu-
tically acceptable salt thereof, or a pharmaceutical composition containing 
either entity, for the manufacture of a medicament for the curative or 
prophylactic treatment of erectile dysfunction in a male animal, including 
man.
50
 
Claim 1 is directed to the treatment of male erectile dysfunction using 
sildenafil, the active ingredient in Viagra.  The scope of the claim is nar-
rowly drawn to the use of a single compound, and therefore it would not 
block a competitor from developing an analogous cGMP PDE-V inhibi-
tor—the family of inhibitors to which sildenafil belongs.  Nonetheless, this 
narrow patent remains a powerful prohibition for preventing others from 
copying Viagra directly, leadingly to the famous Viagra patent invalidation 
challenge where twelve generics companies attacked the patent.  These 
challengers attacked this Chinese patent for failing to enable even a narrow 
claim because the efficacy data supporting the method-of-use patent is 
based on a single unspecified compound from a group of especially pre-
ferred embodiments.  Ultimately the Beijing High People’s Court upheld 
the validity, finding that a reasonable person reading the disclosed data for 
the single compound can infer that the data corresponds to the claimed em-
bodiment.
51
 
In contrast, the corresponding United States Patent number 6,469,012 
initially contained three independent claims and twenty-three dependent 
claims, of which independent Claim 24 was invalidated during re-
examination.
52
  The invalidated Claim 24 independently covered the use of 
selective cGMP PDE-V inhibitor, which could have covered Cialis® and 
 
note 6, at 133–37 (discussing the Viagra case as an example of successful patent protection 
in China). 
 50. China Patent Application No. 94,192,386, Publication No. 1,124,926 (filed May 13, 
1994). 
 51. Tony Chen, Beijing High Court Upholds Viagra Patent in China, JONES DAY 30, 32 
(2008), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/288b184e-c6ee-44b5-800f-
30838f34da54/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/aa464b25-7839-4af9-be34-30d6 
2faf4d56/Beijing_High_Court.pdf. 
 52. U.S. Patent No. 6,469,012 (filed Mar. 4, 1996) [hereinafter ‘012 Patent].  The Unit-
ed States Patent and Trademark Office invalidated Claim 24, which was directed to PDE-5 
inhibitors, during re-examination, which allowed Cialis and Levitra to enter the market-
place.  Ex parte Pfizer, Inc., No. 2009-004106, 2010 WL 532133 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 12, 2010); 
Viagra, Cialis, & Levitra: Board of Patent Appeals Affirms Rejection of Pfizer’s Broad Pa-
tent over ED Treatment, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Feb. 15, 2010), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/viagra-cialis-bayer-board-of-patent-appeals-
affirms-rejection-of-pfizers-broad-patent-over-ed-treatment.html. 
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Levitra®.
53
  Claim 1 of the ‘012 patent covers the combinatorial set of 14 
variable R groups.  Sildenafil, the actual active ingredient in Viagra®, is 
specifically identified as the third structure in dependent Claim 10.
54
  Thus, 
even after reexamination, the ‘012 patent remains extremely broad.  The 
data for that single compound was sufficient to support a broad claim likely 
to cover trillions of chemical entities.
55
 
For a more recent example in the unpredictable arts, one of the patents 
for prostate cancer treatment provides a simple demonstration.  Javtana® is 
a combination therapy approved in 2010.  The most recent Chinese patent 
for Javtana® contains one claim directed to a specific preparation of the 
drug: 
An acetone solvate of 4-acetoxy-2α-benzoyloxy-5β,20-epoxy-1-hydroxy-7 
β,10 β-dimethoxy-9-oxotax-11-en-13 α-yl (2R,3S)-3-tert-
butoxycarbonylamino-2-hydroxy-3-phenylpropionate comprising 6.5% 
acetone by weight.
56
 
The corresponding United States Patent number 7,241,907 was issued to 
Aventis on July 10, 2007.
57
  Claim 1 of the ‘907 patent is identical to the 
Chinese claim except it does not contain the 6.5% acetone weight limita-
tion.
58
  Based on this omission, the United States claim covers the entire 
range of acetone content in the solvate while the Chinese claim is limited to 
an acetone solvate containing 6.5% acetone by weight in accordance with 
the amount of acetone used in Example 1 of the disclosure.
59
  This single 
change opens up vast design around opportunities, as imitators may now 
explore solvates containing acetone in the ranges below 6% or greater than 
7% without fear of infringement in China—a possibility foreclosed in the 
United States. 
The actual proof of China’s narrower claim scope requires an empiri-
cal examination of a statistically significant number of patent claims be-
yond the scope of this article.  Still, these two examples illustrate what vast 
differences can exist for U.S. and Chinese claims of the same technology 
for the most valuable class of IP assets a company can possess.  Yet at the 
 
 53. Viagra, Cialis, & Levitra: Board of Patent Appeals Affirms Rejection of Pfizer’s 
Broad Patent over ED Treatment, PATENTLY-O, Feb. 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/02/viagra-cialis-bayer-board-of-patent-appeals-
affirms-rejection-of-pfizers-broad-patent-over-ed-treatment.html. 
 54. ’012 Patent. 
 55. ’012 Patent, col.5 l.33–43. 
 56. China Patent No. 100429207. 
 57. U.S. Patent No. 7,241,907 (filed Sept. 17, 2004). 
 58. Id. (“An acetone solvate of 4-acetoxy-2α-benzoyloxy-5β,20-epoxy-1-hydroxy-7 
β,10 β-dimethoxy-9-oxotax-11-en-13 α-yl (2R,3S)-3-tert-butoxycarbonylamino-2-hydroxy-
3-phenylpropionate.”). 
 59. U.S. Patent No. 7,241,907, Col.3 ln. 1-3. 
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end of the prosecution process, the Chinese claims remain closely tethered 
to limitations in the disclosure: the Viagra patent disclosed the experi-
mental data for a single compound and the claim covered a single com-
pound, while the Javtana patent disclosed the experimental data for specific 
acetone content and the claim reflected that.  The same disclosure in the 
United States patent application did not limit the patentee to the exemplars 
in the two examples here. 
It is not for a lack of trying: The published applications of the Viagra 
and Javtana patents began with broader claims similar to those ultimately 
granted in the United States.  And at least in these two instances, the quali-
ty of attorneys or market conditions for these claim differences can proba-
bly be ruled out.  Pfizer and Aventis are experienced patentees, and their 
patents cover valuable pharmaceuticals in the marketplace—it stands to 
reason that they have hired the best patent prosecutors money can buy and 
their patents reflect the broadest possible scope given the experimental data 
in the disclosure. 
One can quibble whether the problem is the excess of the United 
States claims beyond the bound of enablement and written description, or 
the narrowness of the Chinese claims.  But the basic point remains that the 
Chinese claims examined here closely track disclosed embodiments and ac-
tual experimental data, and this tendency coincides with the practice of 
central claiming by exemplar that Fromer and Long associated with mod-
ern copyright claims.
60
 
C. Infringement Defenses 
Another area of difference is the number of patent infringement de-
fenses available in China, but not available or much more limited in the 
United States.
61
  Specifically, Chinese patent law recognizes a “non-
commercial use” defense, a prior art defense, a broader experimental use 
defense and a broader prior commercial use defense, in stark contrast to the 
strict liability regime of the United States.
62
  Although these defenses may 
surprise a U.S. patent practitioner, they appear much less controversial 
 
 60. Fromer, supra note 9, at 752; Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copy-
right, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 499–501 (2004) (describing the differences between patent and 
copyright law with respect to each claiming style). 
 61. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons & Xiao Li Wang, Striking the “Rights” Balance Among 
Private Incentives and Public Fair Uses in the United States and China, 7 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 488, 517 (2008) (“Unlike copyright law, U.S. patent law has almost 
no excused infringement provisions that would limit liability for violating the patent own-
er’s exclusive rights.”). 
 62. Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1525 (2007). 
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when viewed through the categories of copyright defenses: (1) the defenses 
for experimental use and non-commercial use create a zone of fair use; (2) 
the prior commercial use defense and prior art defense reflect the defense 
of independent creation, and; (3) the “innocent reseller” defense provides 
damage immunity to good faith retailers akin to the immunity offered to 
Internet and web service providers under the copyright regime. 
1. Experimental Use and Non-commercial Use as Fair Use 
In the United States, the narrow and almost irrelevant common law 
experimental use defense is the sole exception in a patent system that oth-
erwise does not recognize statutorily excused infringement.
63  
The near ab-
sence of excused infringement contrasts sharply with the well-established 
fair use defense in copyright law where non-commercial use or exploratory 
use enjoys some protection.
64
  Commentators have considered the theoreti-
cal pros and cons of inserting a fair use-like exception.
65
  Nonetheless, it is 
unlikely that the experimental use exception will be the anchor for a robust 
fair use doctrine in the United States patent law at this time.
66  
 
Chinese patent law recognizes a broader set of excuses for unauthor-
ized use of patented technology.  Comparing the U.S. and Chinese experi-
mental use exceptions under the rubric of fair use, Llewellyn Gibbons and 
Xiao Li Wang showed that the experimental use defense Chinese patent 
law provides is more flexible than its United States counterpart.
67
  It is legal 
to make or use a patented product for research use purposes, regardless of 
whether “the patented product out of idle scientific curiosity or researching 
the product for the purposes of developing a new commercial product.”68  
In other words, the Chinese experimental use exception gives weight to 
 
 63. Madey v. Duke, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the experimental 
exception is narrow, limited, and available only for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or 
for strictly philosophical inquiry). 
 64. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed To Hide 
Them?  The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
1, 35 (1998) (“To encourage spillover uses and reduce deadweight loss, copyright law relies 
once again on fair use and patent law recognizes a limited experimental use defense.”). 
 65. de Larena, supra note 10, at 780 (discussing a possible fair use doctrine in patent 
law); O’Rourke, supra note 7 at 1188 (discussing a possible fair use doctrine in patent law); 
Katherine Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011) (discussing a 
possible fair use doctrine in patent law for emerging technology). 
 66. Gibbons & Wang, supra note 61, at 518 (“Consequently, as it is currently defined, 
experimental use is unlikely to serve as a basis on which to build “fair use” type defense in 
patent intensive industries.”). 
 67. Id. at 520–21 (discussing experimental use exception in China); Patent Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 8 CHINA PAT. art. 69(4). 
 68. Id. 
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transformative use of a protected product (borrowing a copyright term) 
akin to how copyright permits transformative use within the fair use de-
fense.
69
 
The Sankyo v. Beijing Wansheng case in 2006 and the Eli Lilly v. Gan-
li case in 2007 illustrate the sharp contrast between Chinese and United 
States practices.
70
  Both cases relate to the making and use of patented 
drugs during the research and clinical trial by generics drug companies.  In 
both cases, the generic defendants made and used patentee’s drugs within 
the scope of the patent but the patentees were denied relief.
71
  The courts 
relied in part on the experimental use exception to exempt the generics 
drug companies.  Since then, both the United States and China have codi-
fied a clinical trial exemption, bringing the United States practice closer to 
the permissive Chinese practice.
72
  Nonetheless the distinction remains ma-
terial outside of the clinical trial context. 
In addition to the codified experimental use defense exception that 
Gibbons and Wang examined, Chinese patent law contains a more subtle 
fair use feature based on non-commercial use.  In fact, it is technically not a 
defense at all but carved out of the definition of infringement.  Under the 
Chinese patent statute, infringement of a patent is defined as its unauthor-
ized exploitation for production or commercial purposes.
73
  Thus the pa-
tentee may on occasion fail to overcome the burden of proving this purpos-
ive element such as when a non-profit organization uses a patented 
technology to clean a polluted river or when a consumer purchases an in-
fringing computer for his own personal use. 
What constitutes production or commercial purpose can be vague.
74
  
For example, it is unclear whether the use of an infringing security fence to 
protect a business premise is infringing—the fence is not directly involved 
with the production or commercial activity but its benefit does inure to the 
business bottom-line.
75
  The Beijing High People’s Court previously issued 
 
 69. Pierre N. Leval, Commentary: Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1111 (1990) (“I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily on 
whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative.”). 
 70. See YAHONG LI, IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES 147–48 (2010) (discussing the Sankyo 
v. Wansheng and Eli Lilly v. Ganli cases in the context of Chinese Bolar exception). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra 
note 19, at ch. 8 CHINA PAT. art. 69(5). 
 73. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 1 CHINA PAT. 
art. 11. 
 74. PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY, http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2012-02/01/ 
content_39494.htm (in Chinese). 
 75. Id. 
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an interpretation limiting this exception to personal consumption, although 
that interpretation is not binding on courts outside Beijing.
76
  While this 
gloss has no place in U.S. patent jurisprudence, the purposive element 
speaks directly to one of the copyright fair use factors that look to the na-
ture of the use and the effect upon the market. 
The production or commercial requirement, together with the broader 
experimental use exception, accords the public more leeway to transforma-
tive use, non-commercial use, and de minimis use akin to the fair use doc-
trine. 
2. Prior Art Defense and Prior Use Defense as Proxies for 
Independent Source 
It has been said that “[p]erhaps the most basic difference between pa-
tents and other intellectual property such as trade secrets and copyrights is 
that independent invention is not a defense to infringement.”77  Some 
commentators have suggested that the patent law should adopt the inde-
pendent invention defense from copyright law but the United States and 
Chinese patent law have not embraced this view generally.
78
  The availabil-
ity of prior art defenses and a broader prior user defense under the Chinese 
patent law means that certain types of copying are easier to exculpate. 
Both the prior art defense and the prior user defense implicate a notion 
of chronology—that some occurrences prior to the creation of the patent 
negate the culpability of the accused.  The occurrence may be a prior inde-
pendent invention where the invention is done by the accused in the case of 
the prior use defense or by a third party in the case of prior art defense.
79
  
Under the prior art defense, a defendant can avoid infringement by showing 
that his accused product or process is identical to a technology available 
before the application date of the patent.
80
  In the United States, practicing 
or copying a known pre-existing technology is not a separate defense to in-
 
 76. BEIJING HIGH PEOPLE’S COURT, SEVERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT JUDGMENTS OPINION (TRIAL IMPLEMENTATION), art. 94 (limiting non-
production or commercial purpose to personal consumption). 
 77. Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in 
Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535, 535 (2002); see also Cotropia & Lemley, supra 
note 8, at 1421 n.3. 
 78. See generally Vermont, supra note 12 (discussing the possibility of importing the 
independent creation doctrine into patent law); Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 77. 
 79. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 8 CHINA PAT. 
arts. 62–69(2) (codifying the prior art and use defense). 
 80. Id. art. 62 (“During a patent infringement dispute, if the alleged infringer has evi-
dence proving its or his technology or design belongs to the prior art or is a prior design, it 
will not constitute patent infringement.”). 
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fringement.
81
  Instead, the defendant must show that either the prior art in-
validates the patent or, alternatively, that the patent is possibly valid but not 
covering the accused technology (because otherwise the patent becomes 
invalid for having covered a pre-existing technology).
82
  However, this 
two-prong defense strategy based on the use of prior existing technology is 
not available in China because trial courts are only authorized to adjudicate 
infringement and not invalidity issues.
83
  Instead, a prior art defense is used 
during an infringement trial to avoid liability in lieu of an attack on validi-
ty. 
How does the prior art defense relate to copyright and the concept of 
copying?  Doctrinally the prior art defense requires the defendant to show 
that the accused product or process is “identical or without substantive dif-
ference” to the prior technology—the defense does not require a showing 
of intentional copying of the prior art.
84
  As a practical matter, the defend-
ants most likely to succeed under the prior art defense are those who in fact 
copied or licensed a pre-existing technology.  These prior art copyists need 
not search high and low for an invalidating prior art ex post, and their tech-
nology is necessarily “identical or without substantive difference” follow-
ing the act of imitating the prior art. 
If on the other hand, the accused technology did not descent directly 
from the previously available technology, the challenge of proving identity 
increases and a validity challenge in SIPO based on the prior art becomes 
the better defensive strategy.  The Chinese prior art defense really stands 
for an “I copied from a legitimate source” defense and is a procedural tool 
that brings patent doctrines closer to the commercial reality where the real 
business judgment and practice is between appropriate and inappropriate 
 
 81. Tate Access Floors Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002); Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 658 F.3d 1330 (2011) (rejecting the 
“practicing the prior art defense”). 
 82. Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 658 F.3d at 1337 (“A ‘practicing the prior 
art’ defense typically refers to the situation where an accused infringer compares the ac-
cused infringing behavior to the prior art in an attempt to prove that its conduct is either 
noninfringing or the patent is invalid as anticipated because the accused conduct is simply 
‘practicing the prior art.’). 
 83. Bai & Wang, supra note 49, at 11 (“For example, like Germany, China has a split 
system, with infringement determined by the courts and invalidity challenges heard by 
SIPO’s Patent Reexamination Board.”). 
 84. SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INTERPRETATION 
ON SEVERAL ISSUES REGARDING LEGAL APPLICATIONS IN THE ADJUDICATION OF PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT CASES art. 14 (2010 Judicial Interpretation), (providing that “the prior art 
defense is met if ‘all the technical characteristics alleged to fall within the scope of protec-
tion of a patent right are identical or without substantial differences to corresponding tech-
nical characteristics of a prior art technical scheme’”). 
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copying, as in copyright, and not whether a technology falls under one or 
another side of an ambiguous claim construction or patent validity rule.
85
 
There is another sense that the prior art defense invokes the copy-
right’s mindset, this time to the benefits of the patent owner.  Unlike the 
invalidity defense that exculpates the accused infringer by destroying the 
patent, a successful prior art defense exculpates the accused infringer while 
preserving patent validity.  The patent then lives another day to protect the 
patentee’s unique inventive contribution.  The prior art defense can be un-
derstood as a carve-out, a way of sacrificing patent scope to dodge possibly 
invalidating prior art at the periphery of the claim scope after the patent has 
been granted.  In exchange, the protection of essential embodiments at the 
center of the claim scope survives.  This pro-patentee aspect of the prior art 
defense echoes the tendency to favor concrete protection of the central em-
bodiment—a distinctly copyright-based vision—already discussed in sec-
tions I.A and I.B above. 
The closely related prior use defense has also been compared to the 
concept of independent creation in copyright law.
86
  During an earlier itera-
tion of the patent reform bills, Senator Orrin Hatch related prior user rights 
to independent invention: 
These prior user rights are, in reality, a defense to infringement liability for 
those making or preparing to make commercial use of an invention prior to 
a patent being issued . . . . In some cases, the user has independently invent-
ed the subject matter in question, in which case it would be inequitable to 
subject him or her to infringement liability.
87
 
Under the 2011 America Invents Act, the prior use defense is available to 
all technology but its use remains limited by several conditions: the prior 
use must begin at least one year before the filing date of the patent, the pri-
or use must take place in a manufacturing or other commercial process, and 
the failure to establish this defense may trigger enhanced damages.
88
  In 
contrast, Article 69(2) of the Chinese patent law delivers a broader prior 
 
 85. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, 56–62 (discussing the claim construction process 
as indeterminate and unpredictable); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?  An Em-
pirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 
248–49, 259–60 (2008) (noting that 38% of appealed patent cases had at least one wrongly 
construed term and concluding that “claim construction may be inherently indeterminate”). 
 86. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 249. 
 87. 152 Cong. Rec. 106, 8830–31 (2006) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch before the 
United States Senate on introduction of the “Patent Reform Act of 2006”). 
 88. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Section 5. Defense to Infringement Based on 
Prior Commercial Use, BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/source/America-Invents-
Act/5.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2012). 
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user right.
89
  The Chinese prior use defense only needs to predate the date 
of the patent application and not one year before as required under the 
United States defense; it is not limited to inventions relating to a manufac-
turing or commercial process, and there is no negative repercussion to a 
failed assertion of the prior use defense.
90
 
Although the prior art and prior use defenses do not amount to a true 
independent creation defense, together they immunize defendants who can 
convincingly trace the lineage of the accused technology to technology that 
was used or published some time before the patent was sought.  This is an 
evidentiary and procedural shortcut for those who in fact did not copy the 
product (instead of having to prove invalidity) and embody policy concerns 
akin to an independent creation defense based on the copying of public 
domain work. 
3. Willful Infringement, Innocent Carrier, and the Culpability of 
Knowledge 
The third comparison of exculpatory doctrines relates to rules modify-
ing damages based on the mental state of the infringer as related to copy-
ing.  Lemley identifies the doctrines of willful infringement and indirect 
infringement as one of the few areas where patent law explicitly considers 
copying, and in both cases proof of intentional copying (willful infringe-
ment) ratchets up liability in the form of punitive damages and attorneys’ 
fees.
91
  This liability scheme is consistent with the patent model where the 
default liability is premised on simple trespass without regard to the level 
of intent.
92
 
In contrast, the damage scheme in Chinese patent law reverses the or-
der of default culpability.  Liability for patent infringement presumes in-
fringement by copying as in the case of copyright infringement.  Under 
Chinese patent law, all damage options are compensatory (lost profits, rea-
 
 89. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 19, at ch. 8 CHINA PAT. 
art. 69(2) (“None of the following shall be deemed an infringement of the patent right: . . . 
(2) Where before the date of filing the application for patent, any person who has already 
made the identical product, used the identical process, or made necessary preparation for its 
making or using, continues to make or use it within the original scope only.”). 
 90. Id. (permitting, before the date of application, any person who has already manufac-
tured identical products, used identical methods or has made necessary preparations for the 
manufacturing use is allowed to continue to produce or use it within the original scope). 
 91. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000); United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 20th 
Anniversary Judicial Conference, 217 ER.D. 548, 727 (2002) (“Willful infringement find-
ings, have severe consequences, including enhanced damages and attorney fees.”) (com-
ments of Professor Donald S. Chisum). 
 92. United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 269 (1888) (comparing patent infringement 
to trespass on land). 
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sonable royalty, and unjust enrichment).
93
  Courts cannot impose punitive 
treble damages based on willful infringement.  In this scheme, proof of 
copying may help judges find infringement but does not increase liability.  
Thus the Chinese patent law inherently presumes every act of infringement 
to be in its most culpable form—that of intentional copying. 
A Chinese patent infringer may reduce his liability in certain situa-
tions by showing unintentional transmission under an innocent carrier de-
fense.  Under this defense, an infringer is not liable for past damages if it 
obtained the infringing product in the normal course of business and with-
out knowledge of the infringement although this accidental infringer must 
still comply with an injunction to cease its use or sale.  This defense is par-
ticularly useful for retailers that buy and resell infringing products or for 
downstream manufacturers that incorporate infringing components without 
knowledge of the patent.  In this way, the mental state based defense accen-
tuates the presumed intention underlying the Chinese patent law, and the 
absence of that intention corresponds to reduced liability.   
At first glance, this innocent carrier defense creates a unique exculpa-
tory rule under the Chinese patent law.  In the United States, retailers or 
downstream manufacturers will be jointly and severally liable even though 
they did not directly perform the duplication.
94
  On the other hand, this in-
nocent carrier defense has been an accepted feature of the Copyright Act or 
the DMCA exemption to digital copyrights infringement offered to Internet 
Service Providers (ISP).  ISPs are not liable for hosting pirated contents as 
long as they did so without knowledge of the infringement and ceased dis-
tributing infringing files upon notification of the violation.
95
 
4. Summary 
The Chinese patent law provides defenses that are broader and in addi-
tion to those in United States patent law and instead resemble the structure 
of various source- or use-based defenses in copyright law.  The overall ge-
stalt of the experimental use, non-production use, and non-commercial use 
exceptions forms a standards-based zone of excused infringement that con-
jures the fair use defense under the copyright law even if their exact con-
tours do not completely match.  The prior art and prior use defenses extend 
the patent policy against granting exclusivity to previously known technol-
 
 93. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 14, at ch. 7 CHINA PAT. 
art. 65. 
 94. See Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Bernard Chao, 
80 UNIV. CINCINNATI L. REV. 113, 150 (“In 2001, the Federal Circuit classified the importers 
and resellers of an infringing device as joint tortfeasors and found that they were jointly and 
severally liable.”). 
 95. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(3), 512(c). 
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ogy.  The prior art defenses require a showing that the prior technology 
matches the accused technology: a match that implies a legitimate source of 
the technology and resonates with the defense of copying from the public 
domain in copyright.  The prior use defense resonates with the independent 
creation defense in copyright.  Both defenses ease the evidentiary and pro-
cedural burdens for legitimate copyists.  The damage provisions in China 
presume recompense based on illegal copying and the related innocent car-
rier defense of the Chinese patent law embody a theory of culpability akin 
to ISP exemption in the digital copyright infringement context. 
D. Enforcement Structure 
In the area of enforcement, the Chinese tendency to shrink the dialec-
tic distance between patent and copyright manifests in two areas: (1) pa-
tents and copyrights share the same enforcement institutions in China; and 
(2) the limitations on civil discovery and evidence rules disfavor broad as-
sertions of broad patent scope or patent claims that are tied to a system or 
process, thereby reinforcing the proclivity for concrete, exemplar based 
protection that is reminiscent of copyright. 
1. Institution Design 
The United States developed several institutions responsible for the 
enforcement of patents.  Civil patent disputes are handled by federal district 
courts pursuant to their federal jurisdiction.
96
  These cases are later ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
97
  Administratively, 
border enforcers may seize imports that are counterfeits and piracies, but 
Customs does not seize imports that infringe patents absent a judicial in-
junction or an exclusion order from the International Trade Commission.  
Thus patent disputes at the border must first move through the courts or the 
International Trade Commission, ostensibly because Customs is not 
equipped to solve complex infringement disputes on its own.
98
  In the 
pharmaceutical context, the Food and Drug Administration is required to 
consider patent status in the process of granting marketing approval to ge-
nerics drugs under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
99
  However, the FDA does not 
actually determine validity or infringement.  The Hatch-Waxman Act con-
signs the job of resolving the actual patent disputes to the traditional forum 
of district courts.
100
  These special institutional arrangements gesture to the 
 
 96. 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 
 97. Id. § 1295. 
 98. 19 U.S.C. § 1337. 
 99. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). 
 100. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C), 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
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complexity of a patent dispute involving difficult validity, claim construc-
tion and infringement analysis.   
In practice, the presence or absence of a specialized patent court feeds 
back to the relative strength and breadth of the patent jurisprudence.  
Landes and Posner suggested that a specialized patent court such as the 
Federal Circuit “is more likely to have a ‘mission’ orientation than a gener-
alist court” and therefore tends to favor patents more than the generalist 
federal appellate courts and the enlargement of patent rights.
101
  This insti-
tutionalized rarefication of patent law in turn influences the contour of pa-
tent doctrines in the United States.
102
 
In China, specialized IP courts enhance the protection of IPRs general-
ly without singling out patents as an asset class worthy of special jurispru-
dence, at least with respect to other IP forms.  There are four levels of 
courts: a single Supreme People’s Court, a High People’s Court for each 
province, Intermediate People’s Courts at the prefecture level, and thou-
sands of Basic People’s Courts at the local level.103  Of these, seventy-six 
Intermediate People’s Courts are designated to handle patent infringement 
trials, indicating some recognition of special challenges associated with 
administering patent law.
104
  The Beijing First Intermediate Court also han-
dles appeals from decisions by SIPO.  Notwithstanding these designations, 
these courts remain primarily generalist courts required to handle other or-
dinary civil and criminal disputes.  Within these designated courts, certain 
judges form the IP bench that are entrusted with patent, trademark and cop-
yright disputes, and their decisions are appealed through the normal chan-
nels without regard to the specific types of IPR at issue.
105
  Therefore, 
while only certain courts are designated to handle patent cases, patent cases 
receive the same process as copyright and trademark cases within these 
designated courts.  Specialized “patent courts” like the Court of Appeals 
 
 101. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW, 26–27 (2004). 
 102. Damon C. Andrews, Promoting the Progress: Three Decades of Patent Jurispru-
dence in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 76 MO. L. REV. 841 (2011) (discuss-
ing the impact of the Federal Circuit in various areas of patent law); Ali Mojibi, An Empiri-
cal Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the Federal Circuit’s Patent Validity 
Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 581–582 & fig.1, 586 & fig.4 (2010) 
(demonstrating the effect of the Federal Circuit on substantive obviousness determination). 
 103. DOUGLAS CLARK, PATENT LITIGATION IN CHINA 16–17 (2011). 
 104. Id. at 17, 281–82. 
 105. NIE JIANQIANG, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 
243 (2006) (“China’s courts have established specialized intellectual property divisions to 
try all intellectual property cases starting from 1993.”); MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND 
THE STATE 101–03 (2009) (praising the quality of judges sitting on the intellectual property 
bench). 
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for the Federal Circuit do not exist despite ongoing effort to promote 
them.
106
 
This tendency to place patents on the same footing with copyright and 
trademark carries over to administrative agencies.  For example, Chinese 
Customs has the power to block the importation of products that infringes 
counterfeits and pirated goods, as well as imports and exports that infringe 
patents.
107
  However, this is not to say that Chinese Customs is capable of 
carrying out the full scope of patent infringement analysis in actuality.  The 
Roadmap for Intellectual Property Protection in China, a brochure created 
by the China IPR SME Helpdesk with the consultation of European Patent 
Office and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, describes the reality of 
Chinese Customs’ difficulties with patent enforcement, and to a certain ex-
tent copyright law: 
In practice, Customs officers can rarely make an initial determination from 
an inspection as to whether a particular product is infringing, since such a 
determination is likely to be beyond their technical expertise. Regardless of 
whether the patent or copyright holder has recorded its rights with customs, 
no notice would ever be given to the right holder as officials would not be 
able to become suspicious of a product in order to form their initial deter-
mination.
108
 
Patent infringement cases occupied only three percent of Customs’ en-
forcement load in 2005, indicating an unwillingness to handle such cases 
due to “the complexity of ascertaining patent infringement.”109 
The same engagement and eventual capitulation with patents is true 
for China’s food and drug administration.  Since 2002, China has promul-
gated patent linkage rules akin to the United States’ Hatch-Waxman Act.110  
But the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) actually took it upon 
itself to assess whether it should approve a generic drug.
111
  So what hap-
pens when enforcement agencies try to assess patent issues on their own?  
As the SFDA indicated during a session of the United States-China Joint 
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) discussion: 
 
 106. Q & A with Tian Lipu, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (July 25, 2011), 
http://www.managingip.com/TopicListArticle/2872009/Patents-Topics/Q-A-with-Tian-
Lipu.html?TopicListId=353 (reporting the view of Tian Lipu, the Commissioner of State 
Intellectual Property Office, that China may adopt a single patent appeals court). 
 107. IP Customs Protection Regulations, Art. 7; CLARK, supra note 103, at 27. 
 108. EU-CHINA PROJECT ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
ROADMAP FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA (2008) (emphasis added). 
 109. DIMITROV, supra note 105, at 262. 
 110. See generally, Benjamin P. Liu, Fighting Poison with Poison?  The Chinese Expe-
rience with Pharmaceutical Patent Linkage, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 
629 (2012) (discussing the operation of the Chinese patent linkage system). 
 111. Id. at 639. 
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If the patent is on the compound/composition, it would be relatively easy to 
determine if there is an infringement.  However, if the patent is for a “pro-
cess,” then SFDA feels it cannot and should not be put in the position of 
needing to make a determination, and will often approve the registration 
application.
112
 
It appears that, as a result of placing patent, copyright, and trademark issues 
in the same forum, courts and agencies do not necessarily maintain as sharp 
a boundary between the methods of analyzing infringement across these 
different IPRs.  The overarching mindset is one of comparing the physical 
similarities and differences used for copyright or trademarks instead of en-
gaging in the meticulous claim construction or process-based infringement 
analysis that is often associated with patent infringement cases in the Unit-
ed States. 
2. Limited Discovery Rule  
In China, the party asserting a proposition bears the burden of proving 
that proposition in trial.
113
  Chinese civil litigation rules permit very limited 
discovery—parties cannot take depositions of factory workers, inspect the 
accused factory, or compel document production.
114
  Moreover, judges tend 
to rely on written evidence over oral testimony.
115
  These procedural con-
straints limit whether litigants can prove the proposition they assert during 
trial.  These evidentiary hurdles prove less troubling for product-based pa-
tent claims: the patentee can meet the burden of production by obtaining a 
sample of the infringing product and comparing it to the patent claims to 
show that the accused product contains every feature described in the pa-
tent claim.  However, if the patent claim is directed to a process, the patent-
ee is unlikely to obtain the evidence necessary to prove infringement from 
a willing source outside the infringer’s control.  Instead, the success of the 
patentee to prove infringement lies at the mercy of evidence in the defend-
 
 112. U.S.-CHINA JOINT COMMISSION ON COMMERCE AND TRADE MEDICAL DEVICE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL SUBGROUP, PHARMACEUTICAL TASK FORCE MEETING 3–4 (AUG. 30, 2005) 
[hereinafter TASK FORCE MEETING], available at http://ita.doc.gov/td/health/jcctpharma05 
_1.pdf. 
 113. CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, art. 64 (China). 
 114. See Samir B. Dahman, Protecting Your IP Rights in China: An Overview of the 
Process, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 63, 80 (2006); Jeffrey M. Duncan et al., A Compari-
son Between the Judicial and Administrative Routes to Enforce Intellectual Property Rights 
in China, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 529, 535 (“There is no evidentiary discov-
ery system in China.”). 
 115. CLARK, supra, note 103, at 106 (“Evidence of witnesses is given little weight.”). 
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ant’s possession.  This is already a problem for companies in the United 
States, and only gets worse in China.
116
 
The 2001 revision of the Chinese Patent Law addressed this asym-
metry by codifying the “reverse burden of proof”: when a patentee alleges 
the infringement of a process patent for manufacturing a new product, the 
burden of production lies on the defendant to demonstrate the use of a non-
infringing process.
117
  Yet this technical adjustment has proven unwieldy 
for two reasons. 
First, in order to avail itself of this procedural device, the patentee 
must still prove that the product produced by the accused process is identi-
cal to the product produced by the patented process.
118
  The patentee must 
prevail in what amounts to a mini product infringement suit before the 
court will reverse the burden of proving process infringement.  Second, the 
emphasis on the newness of the product limits the use of this doctrine to a 
class of inventions where a process patent is least needed—a new prod-
uct.
119
  The patentee is better off obtaining and relying on product-based 
protection, especially since it must prove that the accused produced an 
identical product in any event.  It should be noted that the same problem 
also exists for “system” claims that are directed to a specific system operat-
ing in a certain way, usually in the telecommunication or business method 
area.  While a system claim is nominally based on a physical thing, it is in 
reality an organization of physical things in accordance with the operation 
of a specific process.  Therefore, the proof of a system claim infringement 
relies on access to operations internal to the infringer, which poses the 
same difficulties as proving process infringement. 
A recent opinion by the Chinese Supreme People’s Court illustrates 
this asymmetry between product and process patents.  In Eli Lilly v. Jiang-
su Hansoh Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., the Supreme People’s Court resolved 
a decade-long pharmaceutical patent dispute in favor of a Chinese generic 
drug maker.
120
  The case stemmed from Jiangsu Hansoh Pharmaceutical 
 
 116. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 125 (“And in general, firms report that 
they can detect infringement in most products, but not in most processes.”); IAIN M. 
COCKBURN & REBECCA HENDERSON, SURVEY RESULTS FROM THE 2003 INTELLECUAL 
PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION SURVEY ON STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (2003) (noting that 71% of the surveyed IPO members reported that it is straight-
forward to identify infringement of product patents, but 79% noted that it is not straightfor-
ward to identify infringement of process patents). 
 117. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 14, at ch. 7 CHINA PAT. 
art. 61. 
 118. CLARK, supra note 103, at 122. 
 119. Id. 
 120. SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. OF CHINA, (Dec. 3, 2010), http://ipr.court.gov.cn/sdjdws/ 
201104/t20110422_141610.html. 
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Co. Ltd.’s (江苏豪森药业股份有限公司) manufacture and sale of a generic 
version of Eli Lilly blockbuster cancer drug Gemzar in violation of, inter 
alia, Eli Lilly’s process patent directed to a method for purification and 
separation of a desirable intermediate (Patent II).
121
  The trial judge relied 
on an expert report from the Jiangsu provincial government and ruled in 
favor of Hansoh.
122
  On appeal to the SPC, Eli Lilly challenged the credi-
bility of the new test report because the testing agency engaged in ex officio 
contact with Hansoh and failed to make all experts available for cross-
examination.  Eli Lilly also argued that Hansoh failed to prove the authen-
ticity of the manufacturing process it provided to the experts and that the 
defendant never met its burden of showing that its process was non-
infringing.
123
 
Eli Lilly lost all of its arguments on appeal because the discovery and 
evidentiary practice was consistent with Chinese procedural process, and 
sufficient evidence showed that the patent was not infringed in any event.  
Interestingly, the Supreme People’s Court noted that the burden never re-
versed in this case.
124
  While Gemzar is undisputedly a new product, the 
patent is directed to the process of creating an intermediate, and Eli Lilly 
failed to show that defendant’s intermediary product was identical to that 
produced by Eli Lilly’s process.  Query how Eli Lilly can obtain a genuine 
sample of a reaction intermediary from Hansoh to prove identity and re-
verse the burden of production if the reverse burden is necessary to prove 
its lack of process information in the first place. 
Thus while product and process are equally eligible for patent protec-
tion, China’s civil procedures seriously disadvantage process patents and 
system claims.  As a result, the Chinese patent system offers much stronger 
protection for concrete physical products that are publicly available than 
for processes and systems practiced behind closed doors. 
E. Summary 
To recap, Chinese patent law exhibits several features traditionally as-
sociated with the copyrights paradigm.  The prevalence of design and utili-
ty model protection, the patent eligibility rules and disclosure rules, and the 
institutional enforcement capacity favor narrow product based protection.  
The patent defenses trace the contour of copyright defenses, taking into ac-
count considerations of fair use, independent creation and actual copying.  
Infringement determination tends to depend more on side-by-side compari-
 
 121. China Patent No. 95196272.8 (filed Nov. 1, 1995). 
 122. SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. OF CHINA, supra note 120. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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sons and less on sophisticated construction of claim scope.  Together, the 
Chinese patent law is not so preoccupied with conferring the broad protec-
tion of an idea to the winner of a technological race.  Instead, it is more fo-
cused on the protection of specific physical expressions of that idea from 
slavish copying. 
II.  A THEORY OF IP MODALS 
The previous sections draw out features of the Chinese patent system 
that are commonly associated with copyright: the emphasis on physical fix-
ation, a penchant for concrete, product based protection, the corresponding 
mushrooming of narrow rights, proliferating defenses to navigate the river 
of innovation around reefs of proliferating rights, and enforcement organs 
that analyze patent disputes with a proclivity towards a comparison of simi-
larities.  However, it does not explain why this is so. 
Is the analogy to copyright merely a fortuitous descriptive coinci-
dence, or does it gesture towards a latent causal connection?  While it is 
difficult to imagine a grand architect of the Chinese IP law consciously de-
signing a patent system to resemble that of copyright, perhaps their resem-
blance emerged from the confluence of several forces that push Chinese pa-
tent law towards a copyrights regime: (1) the international preoccupation 
with unauthorized copying; (2) the domestic need to balance innovation in-
centive and access to knowledge; (3) the limited resources and experience 
to implement complex patent rules; and (4) the discursive persuasiveness of 
an anti-copying regime. 
A. International Pressure 
The post-TRIPS international IP regime is an offshoot of the prevail-
ing trade order and embodies the fears and loathing of the IP rich against 
unauthorized copying.  The imprimatur of anti-copy discourse is clearly 
visible in TRIPS negotiation and in bilateral IP disputes.  The TRIPS 
Agreement that forms the foundation of the current international IP order 
was created to combat proliferating global infringement.
125
  China, like 
many developing countries, initially adopted IP law in order to appease 
foreign governments and businesses whose primary concern is that of pira-
cy and counterfeiting.  Thus the anti-copy discourse lies in the genetic 
makeup of China’s IP law. 
 
 125. Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property 
Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 356–58 (2004) (noting the desire of developed countries 
to introduce anti-counterfeiting provisions into the GATT trade agreement, which subse-
quently became the TRIPS agreement). 
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Foreign critics of China primarily focused on counterfeiting and pira-
cy, the subjects of trademark and copyright respectively.
126 
 However, this 
discourse to stop unauthorized copying can bleed over into patent law.
127 
 
The tendency, of copy-based narrative to influence patent law, is clearly 
visible from the early days of the United States-China bilateral trade-IP 
conflicts.
128
  Beginning in 1989, China consistently occupied the USTR’s 
annual Special 301 watch list as a result of widespread copyright piracy.
129
  
The concern for copyright violations, and the definition of piracy quickly 
expanded into technology protection, at first through the crossover area of 
software protection and then quickly into areas of chemical engineering 
traditionally covered by patent law.
130
  This statement regarding China in 
the 1991 Special 301 Report provides an early example: 
China is our only major trading partner to offer neither product patent pro-
tection for pharmaceuticals and other chemicals, nor copyright protection 
for U.S. works.  In addition, trademarks are granted to the first registrant in 
China, regardless of the original owner.  Trade secrets are not adequately 
protected in China.  As a result, piracy of all forms of intellectual property 
is widespread in China, accounting for significant losses to U.S. indus-
tries.
131
 
From the perspectives of the USTR, all areas of Chinese IP law—including 
issues of patentable subject matter in chemicals—are conjoined at the hip 
via the trade discourse of piracy and measured according to the severity of 
this condition.  This is a pattern that will continue and grow more elaborate 
for the next twenty years, as increasing Chinese manufacturing capability 
expands its ability to duplicate an ever more sophisticated menu of prod-
ucts.  For most of the history of the Special 301 Reports, the USTR made 
 
 126. See DIMITROV, supra note 105, at 266. (“[P]atents have been free of both foreign 
and domestic pressure for enforcement.”); ORCUTT & SHEN, supra note 6, at 127–28 (“Chi-
na’s counterfeiting/piracy problems are primarily trademark and copyright problems, not 
patent problems.”). 
 127. DIMITROV, supra note 105, at 59–67 (discussing the role of foreign pressure on 
copyright and trademark issues). 
 128. Id. at 54–55 (discussing the history of the Special 301 trade sanctions). 
 129. Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from In-
fringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1457 (2000).  
See generally Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term Copy-
right Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 29 (1995) 
(discussing the use of Special 301 actions on China); Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian 
Values, supra note 1 (listing China’s presence on the 301 watch list). 
 130. See, e.g., SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 7 (1989) (listing “Improved and adequate patent protection for all 
classes of inventions” as one of three goals). 
 131. SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE 2 (1991). 
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scant reference to Chinese innovation policy even though that is the tradi-
tional preoccupation of the patent system.  To the extent any innovation 
policy is mentioned with any detail, the discussion centered on eliminating 
trade barriers to United States pharmaceutical companies as a means to 
support pharmaceutical innovation.
132
  The USTR first referenced Chinese 
innovation policy in 2006.
133
  And it was not until 2010 that the USTR used 
the term “indigenous innovation” and examined China’s innovation policy 
in greater detail.
134
  The same tendency to emphasize problems of unau-
thorized copying can be seen in the JCCT meetings as well as International 
Trade Commission studies.
135
 
To be sure, from the perspectives of non-Chinese governments and 
businesses the primary objective of Chinese IP protection is to protect their 
foreign technology from being duplicated in China and to preserve their 
competitive advantage.  They have few reasons to promote IP for the sake 
of developing innovation capacity in China.  Interestingly, even academic 
writers without an immediate economic stake in the international trade sys-
tem tend to examine Chinese IP primarily through the lens of IPR theft and 
copying—a theme reflected in the titles of seminal monographs in the field 
of Chinese IP law such as: To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense by Pro-
fessor William Alford, The Politics of Piracy by Professor Andrew Mertha, 
 
 132. SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE 7 (2009). 
 133. SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE 17 (2006).  The report states: 
  [T]he United States is alert to U.S. industry concerns about the possibility that 
laws or policies in a variety of fields might be misused to favor domestic over for-
eign IPR.  Such concerns are especially relevant in light of recently issued Chi-
nese government policies establishing a procurement preference for domestically 
innovated products, statements and consideration of legal changes regarding such 
areas as compulsory licensing and the use of IPR in setting standards, and other 
emerging legal and policy developments that have the potential to affect IPR pro-
tection and market access for IPR-bearing goods and services. 
Id. 
 134. SPECIAL 301 ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE 19 (2010). 
 135. U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, USTR, 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/october/us-china-joint-
commission-commerce-and-trade (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (reporting primarily copyright 
content concerns in the IPR section); USITC Pub. 4199, i (2010) (“This is the first of two 
reports requested by the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (Committee) on the effects of 
IPR infringement and indigenous innovation policies in China on U.S. jobs and the U.S. 
economy.”). 
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and Piracy and the State by Professor Martin Dimitrov.  Law review arti-
cles discussing piracy and counterfeits are legion.
136
 
These non-Chinese perspectives have had a profound impact on the 
historical evolution of Chinese patent law, detailed in these articles and 
book-length treatments.
137
  A summary will suffice here.  In 1992, China 
faced threats of trade sanctions from the USTR for failing to curb rampant 
copying of IP owned by United States interests.
138
  In response, the Chinese 
government agreed to a 1992 Memorandum of Understanding that lead to 
its membership in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works and the Geneva Phonograms Convention, as well as the ex-
pansion of its patent law to protect pharmaceuticals.
139
  Later, following 
another round of negotiation, the United States and China entered into the 
1995 Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, which gave rise to 
the State Council Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights.
140
  
A later patent law revision in 2001 came about as part of China’s effort to 
join the World Trade Organization.  It has been noted that the amendments 
in 1992 and 2001 were adopted to be “as familiar as possible to that of for-
eign investors” in order to attract foreign investments.141 
Complaints of foreign IP owners primarily focused on unauthorized 
copying, be it movie piracy or industrial reproduction.  This foreign pres-
sure prominently shaped and continues to shape Chinese patent law.  It is 
no surprise that Chinese patent law should become preoccupied with IPR 
theft and copying. 
B. Domestic Needs 
Although IPR protection in China initially arose in response to charg-
es of IPR theft, the government has turned the focus on IPR inward to ad-
 
 136. See, e.g., Ralph Oman, Copyright Piracy in China, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 583 (2006); Yu, From Pirates To Partners supra note 49.  A search by the author 
in the Westlaw database for “pirate” or “piracy” and “China” or “Chinese” returned 46 arti-
cles and comments on the topic. 
 137. See generally ALFORD, supra note 18, at 30–55 (reviewing historical foreign pres-
sure against Chinese copyright piracy); ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY 3 (2005) 
(identifying the guiding question of the book as: “What has been the impact of external 
pressure on China’s policymaking and implantation processes?”). 
 138. ALFORD, supra note 18. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, U.S.–P.R.C., 34 
I.L.M. 881 (1995). 
 141. EU-CHINA PROJECT ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 
4, at 1. 
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dress domestic needs.
142
  To be certain, unauthorized copying is more ram-
pant in China than in the United States and Chinese piracy undermines 
Chinese rights owners to an even greater extent than foreign rights own-
ers.
143
  The characteristics of Chinese patent law—its emphasis on physical 
fixation and embodiments, its myriad defenses, and its reliance on similari-
ty tests—is every bit the product of China’s own social, economic and 
technological needs. 
Justin Lin, the Chief Economist and the Vice President of the World 
Bank, attributes the rise, fall and re-rise of the Chinese civilization to the 
relative technological developments between the West and China.
144
  For 
developing countries like China, he recommends a strategy of “compara-
tive advantage following,” where, instead of investing in capital-intensive 
heavy industry or costly research and development sectors, China should 
operate according to its comparative advantage of cheap labor and gradual-
ly improve its technology base instead of pursuing capital intensive tech-
nology upgrades.  Thus Chinese innovation tends to take the form of in-
cremental and cumulative inventions.
145
 
This model of innovation, according to Peter Yu, corresponds to the 
prevalence of design and utility model patents.
146
  Yet this congruence goes 
beyond the specifics of design and utility models and dovetails nicely with 
the broader notion of technology protection via the copyright paradigm 
where concrete claims based on exemplars is sufficient to protect specific 
incremental improvements against a copyist while their narrow scope and 
defenses leave ample room for competitors to invent around, creating a 
spillover effect. 
The mode of patent law may also reflect the nature of infringements in 
the relevant territory.  As Peter Yu, and William Hennessey have noted in 
their contributions to this symposium volume, pervasive unauthorized cop-
ying in China has recently taken on the label of “Shanzhai culture,” a refer-
ence to mountain bandit hideouts of yore and the accompanying morally 
ambiguous Robinhoodism.
147
  In contrast, copying is “rare” in United 
 
 142. Id. at 50 (recognizing the third revision of the patent law as a way of enhancing 
China’s innovation capacity and economic and social development). 
 143. DIMITROV, supra note 105, at 67–68 (noting the importance of domestic media and 
IPR interest group because “[t]he government is ultimately more concerned about domestic 
audiences than about the wishes of foreign governments”). 
 144. JUSTIN LIN, DEMYSTIFYING THE CHINESE ECONOMY, 124–51 (2011) (discussing 
“comparative advantage following”). 
 145. See Yu, Intellectual Property Law and Asian Values, supra note 1. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See William Hennessey, Deconstructing Shanzhai—China’s Copycat Countercul-
ture: Catch Me If You Can, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 609 (2012); Peter K. Yu, The Rise and 
Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 525 (2012). 
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States patent disputes.
148
  Infringements frequently arise out of independent 
creation as companies at the forefront of their fields vie for the next break-
through technology.
149
  The preoccupations of the Chinese patent system 
with the duplication of specific embodiments and the United States patent 
system with the breadth of coverage are entirely consistent with the differ-
ent patterns of patent disputes and levels of technological development. 
Chinese judicial guidelines give official expression to these senti-
ments.  For example, the Chinese Supreme People’s Court (the SPC) re-
cently issued judicial guidelines for IP infringement adjudication titled 
Opinion on Several Issues Relating to Sufficient Utilization of IP Adjudica-
tion to Foster Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture and to 
Promote Autonomous and Coordinated Economic Development.
150
  The 
guideline urges courts to balance between claim scope and socio-economic 
condition.
151
  Pioneering invention involving a high degree of innovation, 
research and development investment or contribution to economic growth 
should receive broader protection and more liberal application of the doc-
trine of equivalents.  Incremental inventions, on the other hand, should re-
ceive narrower protection.
152
  The SPC also endorsed the “principle of bal-
anced construction” (折 衷 解 释 原 则 ), a doctrine of claim construction first 
promulgated by the High People Court of Beijing 10 years ago.
153
  Under 
the principle of balanced construction, courts should avoid constructing 
claims based purely on peripheral claiming according to the text of the 
claims or central claiming of the heart of the invention.
154
  Instead, courts 
 
 148. Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 8, at 1457. 
 149. See id. at 1425–26. 
 150. Youguan Yu Dao Fu Si Te De IP Cai Jue De Zugou Shiyong Xiangguan De Ruo-
gan Wenti De Jianjie Fazhan He Shehuizhuyi Wenhua De Fanrong He Cujin Zizhi He 
Xietiao Jingji Fazhan (有 关 与 到 弗 斯 特 的 IP 裁 决 的 足 够 使 用 相 关 的 若 干 问 题 的 见 解 发 
展 和 社 会 主 义 文 化 的 繁 荣 和 促 进 自 治 和 协 调 经 济 发 展 ) [Opinion on Several Issues Re-
lating to Sufficient Utilization of IP Adjudication to Foster Development and Prosperity of 
Socialist Culture and to Promote Autonomous and Coordinated Economic Development], 
2011 Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. (Sup. People’s Ct. 2011) (China); see also Benjamin Bai & 
Helen Cheng, Chinese Supreme Court Brings About Sea Change for Patent Litigation in 
China, ALLEN & OVERY (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/Knowledge/Editorial.aspx?content 
TypeID=1&contentSubTypeID=7944&itemID=65464&prefLangID=410. 
 151. See Bai & Cheng, supra note 150. 
 152. See id. 
 153. You Guan Ruo Gan Wen Ti De Zhuan Li Qin Fan Jian Jie (有 关 若 干 问 题 的 专 利 
侵 犯 见 解 ) [Patent Infringement Opinions on Several Issues], 2001 Beijing Sup. People’s 
Ct. 229 (Beijing Higher People’s Court Sept. 29, 2001), available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/zl/dfsfwj/200804/t20080403_369126.html. 
 154. See id. at ¶ 6. 
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should balance these two extremes when interpreting the claim scope.
155
  
Since modern patent claims generally follow the principle of peripheral 
claiming, the explicit blending of peripheral and central claiming tenden-
cies drives Chinese patent claims toward exemplars and embodiments. 
The Chinese Viagra patent illustrates the relationship between claim 
scope and spillover effect nicely.  Although Pfizer identified the use of 
cGMP PDE-5 inhibitors to treat male erectile dysfunction, its Chinese pa-
tent aimed at the eventual commercial embodiment only.  Once the general 
inventive insight is allowed to enter the public domain, it becomes the 
building block for future improvements.  Firms in China are then allowed 
to build on the research and development of others and harvest previously 
uncommercialized possibilities.  The disparate impact of the copyright par-
adigm on groundbreaking versus incremental innovations in turn translates 
into a disproportional impact on foreign patent fillers, since multinational 
corporations tends to have more cutting edge innovations according to their 
comparative advantage.  The practical reality is that foreign companies are 
less likely to seek a Chinese patent for minor improvements.
156
 
One may take China to task for the shrewd practice of granting narrow 
patents or recognizing extensive defenses, but this model of innovation 
commands legal, historical and economic legitimacy.  Legally, China’s pa-
tent law complies with its obligation under the primary international IP 
treaty framework embodied in the TRIPS Agreement.
157
  The law does not 
discriminate foreign companies on its face and therefore does not run afoul 
the principle of national treatment under the WTO rules.
158
  With respect to 
specific features of the copyright paradigm examined here, the substantive 
patent requirements of TRIPS accepts the existence of design and utility 
model patents, the description requirement, limitation on patentable subject 
matters, and variations in the test of infringements and defense.
159
 
Historically, the copyright paradigm seems no worse than the devel-
opment path adopted by the United States itself.  In its early days, the Unit-
ed States patent system relied on a system of claiming by embodiments, 
and working models were a required part of the patent application until 
 
 155. See id. 
 156. This tendency is consistent with the well-documented patent filing pattern of for-
eign companies in China, which concentrates almost exclusively in invention patents to the 
exclusion of design and utility model patents. 
 157. 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 14. 
 158. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 3, pa-
ra. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) 
 159. See id. at art. 27–34, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
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1870.
160
  The United States also offered more defenses in the past, includ-
ing a broad prior user defense and the judicial attitude disfavoring “paper 
patents” that were never turned into a commercially viable embodiment.161  
As far as discriminatory practices were concerned, foreigners could not ob-
tain patents in the United States until 1836, and even then they were 
charged application fees that are ten times or more expansive than the 
United States citizens.
162
 
In fact, the copyright paradigm is substantially more equitable than the 
United States approach to free ride on the back of the British industrial rev-
olution outright.  It at least ensures that the innovator receives the economic 
benefit of the commercial embodiment and helps extend the first mover ad-
vantage.  The Chinese Viagra patent, despite its narrow claim scope to a 
single active ingredient, successfully stopped copying by a group of twelve 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturing companies.
163  
To the extent others 
are trying to invent around it, this is no different from the attempts by other 
multinational pharmaceutical companies that are stepping around Pfizer’s 
patent with me-too drugs drawn from the same chemical family as sildena-
fil—Cialis® from Eli Lilly and Levitra® from Bayer.164 
Third, it is possible that the problem actually lays with the United 
States patent law, the poster child for the patent paradigm.  In recent years 
the United States patent system has come under attack for losing its proper 
economic mooring.
165
  The standard of patent eligible subject matter is in a 
 
 160. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (requiring only a written de-
scription of the invention or discovery).  For a general discussion of the history of working 
embodiments, see Douglas R. Nemec & Emily J. Zelenock, Rethinking the Role of the Writ-
ten Description Requirement in Claim Construction: Whatever Happened to “Possession is 
Nine-Tenths of the Law?” 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 357, 365–70 (2007). 
 161. Dayton R. Stemple Jr., Nonuser or Patent Patents, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 23 (1952) 
(discussing “paper patents”); THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT 
ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE, 5–6 (2012) (discussing historical precedents of prior 
user rights defense in the United States patent law). 
 162. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 9, 5 Stat. 117, 121.  See generally Llewellyn Gib-
bons, Do as I Say (Not as I Did): Putative Intellectual Property Lessons for Emerging 
Economies from the Not So Long Past of the Developed Nations, 64 SMU L. REV. 923, 932 
(2011) (discussing historical structural barriers of the U.S. patent law to favor domestic ap-
plicants). 
 163. See Andrews, supra note 49, 10–11; Timothy Roe, Pfizer Emerges Victorious in 
China Viagra Patent Battle, SEEKING ALPHA (Nov. 05, 2007), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/52698-pfizer-emerges-victorious-in-china-viagra-patent-
battle. 
 164. LI, supra note 70, at 54 (characterizing Cialis and Levitra as “me too” drugs of Vi-
agra). 
 165. Several book length critiques of the patent system emerged in recent years.  See, 
e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13; DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT 
CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, 
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flux and culminated in Supreme Court decisions that reined in eligible mat-
ters by invalidating a risk hedging method in Bilski v. Kappos and medical 
diagnostic method in Mayo v. Prometheus.
166
  Critics charge that the scope 
of patents is too amorphous, turning the claim construction process into a 
haphazard guessing game.
167
  The discovery process for ascertaining in-
fringement is costly and difficult.
168
  Biotech, business methods and pro-
cess patents especially demand high transaction cost during patent en-
forcement and allow patent owners to seek nuisance value settlement. 
169
  
The lax disclosure requirements where a single exemplar enables a broad 
patent scope allow claims to cover after-arising technology and stifle tech-
nological progress.
170
  Given the excess of the United States patent system, 
it is reasonable that China would demand more robust boundaries for in-
tangible property rights in the form of higher disclosure and subject matter 
requirements and offer more immunity for defendants who go about their 
business without intent to infringe. 
C. Institutional Limitations 
For another pragmatic reason to adopt a copyright approach to patent 
law, the embodiment based claim and similarity based infringement test 
better matches China’s administrative capacity and institutional weakness.  
Patent administration requires the highly technical and unpredictable pro-
cess of constructing patent claims, followed by an equally technical process 
of assessing whether a product falls within the claim scope.  Institutions in 
developing countries simply are not equipped to handle this high level of 
abstraction required to draw a fixed property boundary from claim lan-
guage.  In contrast, copyright administration is perceived to be simpler to 
administer.  Putting aside the intricacy of copyright defenses, copyright 
protection exists as soon as the work becomes fixed in tangible form, and 
 
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING 
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2012). 
 166. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 167. Schwartz, supra note 85, at 248–49, 259–60. 
 168. The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) estimates the aver-
age cost of completing discovery to be $3.6 million for a patent dispute where the amount of 
controversy is over $25 million.  See AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY, tbl Q42e 
(2011). 
 169. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 131–32, 244–46 (discussing the legal cost of 
patent litigation and the boundary problem in biotech and software area). 
 170. Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 
61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151 (2005), available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv1/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__annual_s
urvey_of_american_law/documents/documents/ecm_pro_064628.pdf. 
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the primary basis of enforcement is an inference of copying drawn from a 
comparison of similarities between two works. 
Administrative capacity can explain several strains of copyright 
tendencies in Chinese patent law observed in the previous Section.  First, it 
manifests in the petty patent context.  Despite the charge of being less in-
novative “junk patents,” practitioners note that “the straightforward nature 
of the utility model patent makes it easier to comprehend and, as a result, 
easier to assert in certain venues of China.”171  The “straightforward na-
ture” likely refers to the simpler and physically fixed patent scope.  Second, 
it is consistent with the product-centric tendency to default towards the 
copyright paradigm as a result of limited civil discovery tools.  This is also 
an explanation for the words of the State Food and Drug Administration 
bureaucrats who are much more comfortable analyzing accused compounds 
instead of processes.
172
  Ditto the Customs agent.
173
  Interestingly, the Unit-
ed States has been content to let Customs address patent issues in China 
even though U.S. domestic law requires its own patent disputes to proceed 
through a judicial or quasi-judicial process.  In any event, the unauthorized 
copying of a patented product is a lesser-and-included offense of patent in-
fringement, where the product itself acts as a fallback guide of claim scope 
and a map of claimed elements for the purpose of infringement analysis. 
China’s nascent legal culture provides an even more important reason 
for adopting a copyright-based approach.  Critics have often noted concerns 
of local protectionism, corruption and the lack of judicial independence as 
potential impediments to the implementation of IPR rules in China.
174
  The 
classic patent claim construction and infringement analysis is highly sub-
jective and susceptible to willful misinterpretation by a judge hostile to the 
patent.  As a result, a broad patent claim may be interpreted away from in-
fringement, more easily stretch to cover invalidating prior arts, and more 
likely to fail the written description standard.
175
  Where the patent protec-
tion is unequivocal on its face, judges and bureaucracies are more likely to 
enforce the patent correctly.  Clear legal entitlement also increases the cost 
 
 171. Li, Xie & Yang, supra note 47. 
 172. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 174. CLARK, supra note 103, at 4–5; T. Bender, How to Cope with China’s (Alleged) 
Failure to Implement the TRIPS Obligations on Enforcement, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROPERTY 
230, 235 (2006) (declaring a “very serious problem is the often incompetent and corrupt ju-
diciary” as a major impediment to IP enforcement in China). 
 175. See Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal and Political Im-
plications, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 353 (2004) (connecting broad, discretionary 
legal standard with susceptibility to “a range of extralegal factors, including the political 
influence of the CCP, corruption, and the traditional importance in Chinese culture of per-
sonal relationships (guanxi)”). 
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of subterfuge.  A corrupt decision-maker would have to think twice before 
rendering a decision that appears clearly contrary to law.  A neutral deci-
sion-maker can better withstand extra-legal influences when the potential 
outcome is clear. 
Viewed in this light, those patentees who lament the narrow scope of a 
Chinese patent may be missing the mark.  Given the youth of patent law 
and the limited capacity of China’s legal institution, narrow patents rooted 
in physical embodiments and exemplars have a greater chance of being en-
forced and are therefore more valuable than a broad but malleable patent. 
D. Discursive Coherence 
Another appealing feature of the copyright paradigm is its discursive 
coherence and normative palatability.  While the concerns of heading off 
international criticism, promoting domestic industry, and acknowledging 
institutional limitations reflect important socio-economic strain, these utili-
tarian concerns need not correspond to a movement towards the copyright 
paradigm.  At this time, China possesses sufficient economic strength to 
resist foreign demands.
176
  Foreign investments are not likely to leave Chi-
na even with its IP enforcement problems, thereby limiting the effect of 
foreign pressure.
177
  Courts can promote the domestic industry in an ad hoc 
and protectionist fashion, of which China has frequently been accused.
178
 
IP paradigms reflect narratives that justify the existence of their re-
spective law, which in turn informs the contour of the doctrines.
179
  Some 
 
 176. See Joseph Fan, et al, Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: China versus the 
Rest of the World, 37 World Development 852 (2009) (noting China as the recipient of the 
most foreign direct investment in the world and the limited impact of weak IP regime in 
China on foreign direct investment given other country factors such as population size and 
demographics). 
 177. See, e.g., Eliza Strickland, A Test Case for Intellectual Property in China, IEEE 
SPECTRUM (March 2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/wind/a-test-case-for-
intellectual-property-in-china.  Despite the potential loss of IP to Chinese infringement, the 
CEO of an American wind power equipment company AMSC opined that the company 
cannot afford to withdraw from China: “It is an economic reality that we must do business 
in China, and I believe we can do it securely and profitably.”  Id.; see also 2010 Shanghai 
IPR Roundtable—Candid Commentary From Industry ¶ 13, WIKILEAKS, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10SHANGHAI53.html (last visited June 18, 2012) (“No-
tably, none of the industry participants indicated they would be leaving the China market 
despite their ongoing IPR problems.”). 
 178. DIMITROV, supra note 105, at 96 (“Most scholars take a dim view of Chinese legal 
reform, focusing on the numerous obstacles facing the courts: low professionalism, local 
protectionism, and lack of independence from the Communist Party.”). 
 179. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); 
Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?  The Philosophy of Property 
Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (1990). 
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notions, like Locke’s concept of morale desert or utilitarian-based exclusiv-
ity to avoid free-riding, apply to patents and copyrights with equal force.  
Others have greater relevance to the patent paradigm than copyright para-
digm.  Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory envisions the patent system as a 
tool that enables a technology pioneer to concentrate and fence off the re-
search agenda against followers.
180
  This in turn encourages the initial de-
veloper to efficiently and cost-effectively develop and exploit a technologi-
cal space while avoiding economic rent dissipation.
181
  Henry Smith 
attributes the differences between copyright and patent to the relative in-
formation cost of delineating and policing different uses of that IPR.
182
 
The patent paradigm presupposes the acceptance of the idea that the 
first creator should exercise exclusive dominion over a technological space.  
In comparison, the copyright paradigm presupposes the acceptance of a 
more modest norm: the idea that one should not copy the work of another.  
The copynorm is a lesser-included norm of the patent norm, the primary 
difference being that the discursive power of the copyright narrative stops 
at the edge of independent creation. 
When it comes to IPR protection in China and developing countries, 
commentators regularly attribute its success and failings to the distance be-
tween contemporary legal regime and social norms.
183
  The closer a legal 
regime aligns with social norms the more traction it has.  What is less ap-
preciated is the different level of norm acceptance required for copyrights 
and patents in societies with a limited appreciation for intangible property.  
All things being equal, one must first accept that it is wrong to copy before 
he can accept that the first winner takes all (more so if he is rarely the first 
winner).  This is true whether the acceptance is based on deontological or 
utilitarian grounds, and whether the subject is creative expression or indus-
trial innovation. 
China has now accepted the copynorm discourse against free-riding 
copies but rejects the winner-takes-all patent norm.  Whether or not steal-
 
 180. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). 
 181. Id.; John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
439 (2004). 
 182. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements in In-
formation, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1807 (2007) (comparing the claiming styles of copyrights 
and patents). 
 183. Chen, Chun-Hsien, Explaining Different Enforcement Rates of Intellectual Property 
Protection in the United States, Taiwan, and People’s Republic of China, 10 TULANE J. OF 
TECH. & INT’L PROP. 211, 254–55 (2007) (attributing weak IP protection to low levels of IP 
awareness); Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual 
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 21 (stressing the importance of “ena-
bling environment for effective intellectual property protection.”). 
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ing a book was ever elegant in China, it is now a recognized offense even 
by those who practice it.
184
  Today the self-imposed shanzhai (mountain 
bandit) label for unauthorized improvers acknowledges its own illegality 
while seeking justification through the language of an alternative ethos and 
social justice.
185
  For another point of comparison, in mid-2011 the IPR 
commitment of the Chinese government and CSR Corporation Limited, the 
State-owned train manufacturer, came under attack for supposedly misap-
propriating high speed rail technology from foreign rolling stock indus-
try.
186 
 The CSR deputy general manager responded that Chinese trains em-
body substantial improvements and is not a mere copy of the original 
foreign models.
187
  While the manager appears to underappreciate the nu-
ance of patent law that an improvement may still infringe, his mistaken le-
gal understanding reveals a consciousness that slavish copying (and only 
slavish copying) is wrong in the industry context. 
Although the shanzhai players and state-owned rolling stock company 
occupy the two extremes of China’s industry ecology, they share a com-
mon IP mindset that is anchored to a copynorm—a norm that channels the 
influence of foreign pressure, domestic technology aspirations, and institu-
tional limitations into a cohesive and coherent normative discourse—which 
in turn shapes the contour of Chinese patent law and practice. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF A COPYRIGHT-CENTRIC PATENT REGIME 
Having arrived at a heuristic theory at the end of our inquiry, this Part 
reflects upon the implications of China’s copyright-centric patent regime.  
There are three main lessons.  First, the discursive framework allows us to 
better predict the future evolution of China’s patent law as well as forming 
better strategies for protecting patent rights in China.  Second, it provides a 
 
 184. See generally ALFORD, supra note 18, at 9–29 (reviewing the historically permissive 
attitude China displayed towards copying).  But see Wei Shi, Cultural Perplexity in Intellec-
tual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant Offense?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 
6–7 (2006) (rejecting the historical and cultural explanation to IPR infraction in China). 
 185. Hennessey, supra note 147, at 634 (“‘Outlaws’ in the shanzhai counterculture live 
by their own internal ethos and according to mutually acknowledged rules, albeit ‘outside 
the law.’”). 
 186. Brian Spegele, Train Spat with Japan Heats Up, CHINA REAL TIME REPORT (July 8, 
2011, 7:32 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/07/08/train-spat-with-japan-heats-
up/. 
 187. See Xin Dingding, High-speed Technology Eyes US Patents, CHINADAILY.COM.CU 
(June 23, 2011, 7:54 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-
06/23/content_12756524.htm (“Our technologies may originate from foreign countries, but 
it doesn’t mean that what we have now all belongs to them.  We have added our knowledge 
gained from experiments to the train and made designs to satisfy our needs, so the new train 
is not theirs anymore.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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clearer account of China’s patent system as a model for other developing 
countries, in contrast with the India model.  Third, it provides a natural ex-
periment to current policy and doctrinal debates in the patent discipline 
generally. 
A. Domestic Prognosis 
If the Chinese patent system indeed reflects the strong influence of a 
copyright system, then two claims exist.  The first claim is predictive, that 
the Chinese patent system will stabilize around its current state without 
harmonizing with the winner-take-all model that the patent system has 
come to follow.  A discourse against slavish copying has certain coherence 
and persuasiveness.  It represents an equilibrium point along the path from 
low protection to high protection.  Therefore, Chinese patent law will stabi-
lize around this concept for some time.  Those who envision a Chinese pa-
tent system on a steady march from low protection to high protection will 
be disappointed.  The protection against unauthorized copying will proba-
bly grow stronger, but the breadth of protection may remain stagnant.  This 
emerging model echoes Peter Yu’s suggestion that China may assume the 
position of being a “norm maker” as it experiments and domesticates patent 
law.  A copyright-like patent system may be precisely one of these emerg-
ing new norms. 
The second claim is prescriptive.  Non-Chinese patentees will do well 
to adapt their IPR strategy to the organizing principles of the Chinese pa-
tent law, such as describing working embodiments, leveraging trade secret 
protection and taking out narrow but fast utility model and design patents.  
Doing so is likely to be more fruitful than fighting for a broad patent scope. 
B. Development Alternatives 
Scholars of the international patent system and development have long 
recognized the need of individual countries to adopt an innovation system 
consistent with the local condition and the Chinese experience offers an in-
teresting variation of the local adaptation process.
188
  Developed countries 
can better afford a high level of protection while developing countries can 
better benefit from a low level of protection.  As international trade in-
 
 188. Bernard M. Hoekman et al., Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Uni-
lateral and Multilateral Policy Options, 33 WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 1587, 1592 (2005) (ac-
knowledging that “a ‘one size fits all’ approach to policy is inappropriate” for the design of 
IP and technology transfer policy); Jean-Eric Aubert, Promoting Innovation in Developing 
Countries: A Conceptual Framework, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7 (“Con-
sequently, innovation policy schemes, have to be tailored to countries’ specific characteris-
tics in line with the recognized fact that ‘one size does not fit all,’ . . . .). 
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creases, local preferences create considerable friction among countries, as 
we have seen in the debate regarding the generic pharmaceutical industry in 
India and counterfeit in China.  A closer look at the Chinese patent system 
offers a lesson that it is possible to have a patent system that offers both 
high and low level of protection at the same time.  This proposition may 
appear nonsensical until we realize that a patent system actually consists of 
one legal regime nestled in another: one that discourages copy-based free-
riding and one that apportions emerging technological fields among pio-
neers. 
The examination of China’s patent system is an attempt to separate the 
two-tiered function of patent law.  It demonstrates that even though China 
is still a developing country, it is possible to recognize and accept the anti-
copying strand of patent law and design a system aimed to curtail wasteful 
duplication of existing technology.  This patent law is consistent with the 
literature on industry development that describes a progression from pure 
copying to incremental innovation to groundbreaking innovation as a coun-
try develops. 
A similar path was taken by the Japanese patent system during the 
1980s and 1990s, which encouraged narrow claims and actual working ex-
amples as a way of promoting domestic companies to invent around these 
narrow rights and foster “me-too” innovation.189  It is no surprise that the 
Chinese patent system was historically connected with that of the Japanese 
patent system.
190
  In contrast, India’s patent system historically resisted 
even the anti-copying component of patent law.  India rejected drug patents 
to permit its generics industry to flourish from the direct copying of foreign 
drugs.
191
  Only in recent years has India recognized drug patents, but a ves-
tige of its copy-friendly patent regime remains for pharmaceutical im-
provement.  India will permit the patenting of improvement drugs only if it 
can demonstrate better efficacy than its predecessor.
192
  As a result, many 
 
 189. See Reiko Aoki, Kensuke Kubo, & Hiroko Yamane, Patent Policy and Public 
Health in Developing Countries: Lessons from Japan, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, May 
2006, at 417, available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/417.pdf. 
 190. See ALFORD, supra note 18, at 69. 
 191. U.S. International Trade Commission, The Emergence of India’s Pharmaceutical 
Industry and Implications for the U.S. Generic Drug Market 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/EC200705A.pdf (discussing India’s 
earlier IP strategy that enabled the development of its generics industry). 
 192. See The Patents Act of 1970, No. 39 of 1970, India Code (1970) (“[T]he mere dis-
covery of any new property of new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known 
process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or em-
ploys at least one new reactant”); Kevin E. Noonan, Indian Supreme Court to Rule Gleevac 
Patent, PATENTDOCS (March 12, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/03/ 
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Indian companies remain free to pursue pharmaceutical derivatives without 
fear of patent infringement but at a cost to incremental innovation at 
home.
193
 
Ultimately, framing China’s adaptive strategy in terms of a shift to-
wards the copyright paradigm sharpens the menu of policy models for de-
veloping countries, as one with coherence beyond the specificity of phar-
maceutical innovation, patent scope or compulsory license issues.  
Policymakers can explicitly recognize activities to be discouraged (slavish 
copying) and promoted (incremental innovation) and borrow copyright 
concepts that are designed to distinguish between these activities. 
C. Doctrinal Experimentation 
The insight yielded by China’s patent law may also benefit developed 
countries.  In examining harmonizing and diversity trends of global patent 
law, John Duffy recognized the value of divergent national practices as a 
way of experimenting with patent law.
194
  China now appears to be the 
proving ground to test some of the latest discussions in the patent commu-
nity that look to appropriate insights from copyright and exploring potential 
cross pollination between the two regimes.
195
 
For example, Bessen and Meurer criticize the current patent system 
for failing to demarcate a clear property boundary and posit that “[t]he 
world of movie production and copyright clearance provides a glimpse of 
what the patent system should aspire to achieve in terms of notice and 
clearance.”196  They singled out biotech patents of early-stage innovations 
and software patents as particularly vague and difficult to enforce patent 
entitlements because their boundaries are ill-defined.
197
  Similarly, Jeanne 
Fromer concluded her study of intellectual property claims with a proposal 
to improve the boundaries in patent rights by incorporating copyright claim 
features such as central claiming by exemplar.
198
  As we have seen, Chi-
 
indian-supreme-court-to-rule-on-gleevac-patent.html (discussing the Gleevac litigation in-
volving the application of section 3(d) of the Patents Act of 1970). 
 193. See Aoki, Kubo, & Yamane, supra note 189, at 418. 
 194. John Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
685, 708 (2002). 
 195. See, e.g., Long, supra note 60, at 499–501 (differentiating patent and copyright law 
based on a theory of claim information); Smith, supra note 182, at 1807 (comparing the 
claiming style of copyright and patent); Fromer, supra note 9 (comparing the claiming style 
of copyright and patent). 
 196. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 48. 
 197. See id. at 244–46 (recommending limitation on abstract patents in the biotech and 
software area). 
 198. See Fromer, supra note 9, at 780–81. 
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nese patent law adheres to the “technical solution” test for patent eligible 
subject matter and the strict disclosure requirement, which reduce the prev-
alence of business method patents and broad patents in the unpredictable 
arts.  As a further fix, Bessen and Meurer also recommend broader im-
munity for good-faith infringers in the flavor of copyright defenses, which 
materializes through the broader prior independent creation defenses in 
Chinese patent law.
199
  If these commentators are right, the Chinese patent 
system may in fact offer a policy balance that better nurtures innovation 
and public interest than a winner-takes-all patent paradigm as it exists in 
the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
Twenty years ago Jerome Riechman situated non-traditional IPs (in-
dustrial designs, mask work, databases and so forth) along a “bipolar struc-
ture” stretching from patents at one end to copyrights at the other end.200  
Riechman explained their proliferation as a coping mechanism for incentiv-
izing incremental innovation.
201
  The Chinese legal system has been asked 
to tackle a similar need and now offers the full panoply of hybrid rights that 
Riechman examined in his article. On top of this, the Chinese patent system 
is now evolving, consciously or unconsciously, in a way that fundamentally 
changes the bipolar analytical framework itself. 
This Article attempts to capture seemingly disparate movements in 
different areas of the Chinese patent law, from prosecution to litigation, and 
from the nature of the entitlement to the nature of the institutions, in order 
to depict an entire choreography.  During this process, the patent pole is 
moving towards the copyright pole, shrinking the doctrinal distance be-
tween these two bodies of creative IP law.  Duffy reserved the benefit of 
experimentation onto the developed countries, cautioning: “It may also be 
unwise for less-developed nations to undertake risky experiments with their 
embryonic patent systems, which may not be able to weather a failure.”202  
Yet it appears that a developing country like China is more open to broader 
experimentations.  Since its passage in 1984, the Chinese patent law has 
been amended in regular intervals of eight to nine years in response to the 
 
 199. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 13, at 248–52 (urging an expanded prior-user 
defense in United States patent law). 
 200. See generally Reichman, supra note 16. 
 201. See id. at 2444. 
 202. John Duffy, supra note 194, at 708. 
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condition of the marketplace.
203
  It also appears that the risk of experimen-
tation is higher in the United States, where a slight legal change may have 
unintended retroactive effects on existing stakeholders.  As Judge Moore 
noted in her concurrence to the Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
United States Patent and Trademark Office: 
If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I might conclude that an iso-
lated DNA sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not patentable 
subject matter . . . . I believe we must be particularly wary of expanding the 
judicial exception to patentable subject matter where both settled expecta-
tions and extensive property rights are involved.
204
  
In contrast, China’s thirty years young patent system is saddled with fewer 
“settled expectations and extensive property rights” and allows it to exper-
iment with rules along an alternative path.  What is at stake then, perhaps, 
is an experiment on the viability of an alternative patent system. 
 
 
 203. See, e.g., EU-CHINA PROJECT ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, 
supra note 141, at 1-11 (discussing the motivation and history behind the third revision of 
Chinese patent law in response to existing implementation). 
 204. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1366–67. (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Mo-
lecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, et al., No. 11-725, 2012 WL 986819, at*1 (U.S. Mar. 
26, 2012). 
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